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INFORMATION AS SPEECH, INFORMATION AS GOODS:
SOME THOUGHTS ON MARKETPLACES AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS
DIANE LEENHEER ZIMMERMAN*
In deciding cases under the First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court is ordinarily
guided by a familiar precept: an individual who legitimately
acquires information is free to use it as she sees fit.1 Only when
faced with a contrary claim supported by an interest of the most
powerful and unusual sort will the Court even entertain an
argument to limit that use.2 In other words, information, ideas,
facts, and concepts-that vast array of human knowledge and
expression-are not available to the public merely as a customary
matter; their use is presumptively and powerfully protected by
the Bill of Rights.3
This principle, however, is only a partial description of the
law's treatment of information. Coexisting with the line of theory
and analysis that renders words, ideas, and facts usable by all
are doctrines that limit such use by directly or indirectly con-
verting information into a form of private property, the access
to and use of which can be denied and transferred according to
the dictates of the commercial marketplace. Examples abound. A
common device for privatizing speech is copyright;4 privatization
can similarly be achieved using § 43(a) of the Lanham Act 5 and
such common law doctrines as trade secrets, rights of privacy
and publicity, and unfair trade practices.6
These dual approaches-one that treats information as a public
commodity and one that deems it a form of private wealth-have
* Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., Beaver College, 1963; JD., Columbia
University, 1976. I would like to thank Ralph Brown and Rochelle Dreyfuss for their
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Support for this research was
provided in part by a grant from the Filomen D'Agostino Greenberg and Max E.
Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at New York University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (refusing to permit invasion
of privacy claim against newspaper that published the name of a rape victim).
2. See infra notes 327-50 and accompanying text (discussing conditions under which an
individual's right to privacy precluded unconsented publication of information about her).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
5. 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (1988).
6. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (protecting information
about the manufacture of crystals as a trade secret).
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frequently been assumed to be entirely compatible.7 Copyright,
for example, is commonly described as completely consistent with
the First Amendment." The reasoning is that, because this form
of private property rights-which is also provided for in the
Constitution9- extends only to the form in which an author has
chosen to cast her thoughts or concepts and not to the thoughts
or concepts themselves, copyright does not significantly constrain
the rights of free speech and press. As long as others express
themselves differently, they may utilize all the same information
and ideas as the holder of the copyright.10 The addition of the
fair use doctrine," which permits at least some unimpeded uses
of the copyrighted expression, is often claimed to be the vehicle
through which any residual conflict between claims of liberty and
property are fully resolved. 12 In recent years, a few dissenting
scholars have argued that the accommodation is actually imper-
fect and that copyright and free speech can collide. 3 Even they,
however, have for the most part tended to view the arena for
that conflict as narrowly circumscribed. 4
The possibility of doctrinal inconsistencies between speech and
property claims has been more widely acknowledged in areas
7. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1179-82 (5th Cir. 1980) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating
fair use doctrine takes care of residual First Amendment concerns).
9. The Copyright Clause appears in the body of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, S 8, cl. 8. This clause gives Congress the power "to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries:' Id. Congress enacted the first statutory
protections for authors in 1790. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
10. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. S 102(b) (West Supp. 1991) (stating the statute does not protect
ideas or concepts).
11. 17 U.S.C. S 107 (1988). Originally judge-made law, Congress codified the fair use
doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-98 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). See infra note 126 and accompanying text
(discussing the operation of the fair use doctrine).
12. See Triangle Publications, 626 F.2d at 1174.
13. See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations
on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 293-99 (1979) (discussing the conflict
between copyright and free expression); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1193-
1200 (1970) (discussing conflict between First Amendment and copyright law).
14. Both Nimmer and Denicola, see supra note 13, recognize cases in which the public
importance of the information would justify a use of copyrighted material that would not
be privileged by the fair use doctrine. Paul Goldstein also recognized a need, based on
First Amendment principles, for limits on injunctive relief in copyright. Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 1030 (1970). Nimmer and
Goldstein were virtually the first scholars to assert that any conflict existed between
free speech and copyright.
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outside the realm of statutory copyright. 15 Even within this
framework, though, courts and commentators generally have not
seen the process of linedrawing between property rights and
free speech interests as especially troubling or difficult.16
In actuality, however, where courts will choose to draw the
line between ownership and free use has often been unpredictable
and difficult to defend by reference to neutral analytical princi-
ples. 7 The truth is that, despite large areas of peaceful coexis-
tence between the values protected by the Speech and Press
Clauses and those defended by property doctrines, conflict be-
tween the two is serious. 8 What seems to have happened in the
course of this conflict is that an ever-expanding array of new or
reconstructed property theories is cannibalizing speech values at
the margin. 9 In large part, this has occurred not because speech
claims are inherently weaker than property claims, but because
courts fail to think critically about the justifications for, functions
of, and limitations on property rules in the sensitive arena of
speech.
One might posit, for example, that property rights are appro-
priately assigned in speech when needed to allocate its economic
15. See, e.g., Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal
of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1578 (1979) (discussing portrayals published
without consent); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment
Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TuL. L. REV. 836, 837 (1983)
(discussing publicity rights).
16. As one court explained in a discussion of the common law right to publicity, which
is sometimes treated as a branch of privacy protection and sometimes as an independent
property right:
Ordinarily, only two branches of the law of privacy, namely, public disclosure
and false light, create tension with the First Amendment, because of their
intrusion on the dissemination of information to the public .... Normally,
in a commercial appropriation case involving the right of publicity, the only
question is who gets to do the publishing, since the celebrity is primarily
concerned with whether he gets the commercial benefit of such publication.
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 350 (Ct. App. 1983). A commentator,
discussing the common law misappropriation doctrine, dismissed the entire First Amend-
ment problem in this area in one sentence: "Whatever freedom state judges (or federal
judges looking to state law) have to create intellectual property under misappropriation
doctrine is constrained by the preemptive effect of federal law and the first amendment,
which limit the amount of mischief [the doctrine] can create." Douglas G. Baird, Common
Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated
Press, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 411, 422 (1983).
17. See infra notes 24-51 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent analyses and
results in recent cases).
18. See infra notes 319-79 and accompanying text (discussing modern cases in which
property doctrines frequently run afoul of First Amendment principles).
19. See infra notes 322-45 and accompanying text (giving recent examples of property
theory inhibiting free speech values).
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value or to provide incentives for the creation and distribution
of desired goods.20 This does in fact provide a good part of the
justification for intellectual property schemes, 21 including much
that is, from a free speech perspective, unexceptional. Indeed, a
significant portion of the pressure to remove increasing amounts
of speech from the category of "free" to "owned" reflects the
understandable desire of information "generators" to capture the
economic potential that their efforts represent.22
A distinction drawn between property rights and speech rights
along economic lines, however, is too simplistic to provide an
adequate rationale for preferring privatization to First Amend-
ment interests. Much of the information currently free of com-
modification under the Speech and Press Clauses has economic
value and could easily become exchangeable in traditional mar-
kets if courts or legislatures were to award exclusive rights in
it.
Nor does a distinction along economic lines adequately explain
the current state of the law and its apparent tendencies toward
enlarging the realm of property. Courts have also assigned prop-
erty and quasi-property rights to protect intangible interests that
are not the traditional subject of markets.2 As a result, exclusive
rights to control the use and dissemination of information have
been granted to protect numerous personal and dignitary inter-
ests alongside the economic ones.
Without obvious bright lines to establish the limits of com-
modification, disputes over free versus exclusive use are often
resolved mechanically rather than analytically, coming down to
contests of characterization. The rules governing the contest are
largely unarticulated but seem to be result-driven; once the court
has decided which label to attach to a dispute-free speech or
property-the outcome is by and large determined.2 As a result,
20. See infra notes 272-318 and accompanying text (discussing the role of incentives
for creation as rationale for intellectual property law).
21. The Supreme Court discussed extensively the role of incentive theory in intellectual
property in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1966), a case that involved an
interpretation of patent law.
22. See infra note 269 (discussing the attempt to protect compilers based solely on the
value generated by their industrious collection of materials).
23. As this Article demonstrates in later sections, much of the law protecting what
are loosely defined as privacy interests derives from and retains many characteristics in
common with property law schemes, even if it is technically denominated as protection
against personal injury. See infra notes 247-61 and accompanying text.
24. Even when a noncontroversial property right is impacted-for example, when
someone has quoted verbatim some substantial portion of a copyrighted work without
[Vol. 33:665
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depending on the legal bin into which complaints are sorted,
courts are treating quite differently complaints that seem similar
in most regards.2 5 Efforts to control the use of information or
ideas by others will generally be doomed from the outset if the
claim is classified as an attempt to interfere with freedom of
speech. If, however, a claimant can march the same basic dispute
onto the field and successfully raise the standard of property
rights, her likelihood of success will improve markedly.
Examples of the effect of categorization are plentiful, but two
comparatively recent disputes, one involving a major corporation
and the other a famous author, are particularly apt illustrations
of the difference a label can make.
In June, 1991, the Wall Street Journal released some reports
revealing the pending resignation of a Procter & Gamble exec-
utive and the possibility that a division of the Cincinnati-based
corporation might be sold.26 Officers of the company were out-
raged that this information had been "leaked" to and published
by the Wall Street Journal.27 When viewed from a First Amend-
ment perspective, however, the right to disclose and to publish
material of public concern about an important company is ordi-
narily quite clear. The corporation, therefore, took a different
tack. It invoked the law of property in the form of an Ohio
statute28 treating the disclosure of confidential information to
those not "privileged" to receive it as a criminal offense. 9
permission-the decision to penalize or excuse the taking seems often to turn rather
arbitrarily on whether the court is more or less sympathetic toward the speech objectives
of the user. Compare Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310
(2d Cir. 1966) (holding defense of fair use successful when court suspected plaintiff was
trying to prevent any unconsented use of information about Howard Hughes), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1009 (1967) with Meerpol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding
defense of fair use unsuccessful when court seemed sympathetic toward objectives of
children of executed spies Ethel and Julius Rosenberg), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
These two cases are quite similar; what seems to distinguish them most clearly is the
absence in one case, and the presence in the other, of the sympathy of the appellate
court with the plaintiffs desire for privacy.
25. *See infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text.
26. Alecia Swasy, Procter & Gamble Food Executive is Forced out, WALL ST. J., June
10, 1991, at B5; Alecia Swasy, P & G May Soon Peddle Something New: Pieces of Its Food
and Beverage Division. WALL ST. J., June 11, 1991, at B8.
27. See Timothy Egan, Vast Influence of Procter & Gamble Revives Old Quesions in
Cincinnati, N.Y. TMIES, Sept. 1, 1991, at 18.
28. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1333.81 (Baldwin 1991).
29. Certain corporate information is generally agreed to be protected by property law
under the rubric of trade secrets. The protection is normally limited, however, to such
matters as formulas, patterns, devices, or customer lists that are kept confidential and
that give the company an advantage in competing with other firms. See Edmund W.
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The result was the intervention of local prosecutors and the
issuance of a subpoena under which thousands of Cincinnati Bell's
customer telephone records were obtained in an effort to locate,
and possibly to prosecute, the sources of the leaks-or to put it
in property terms, the information thieves.30 Whether such a
prosecution would have ultimately withstood attack is not known
because Procter & Gamble, presumably stung by the spate of
negative publicity, later decided to drop the efforts to find the
culprits.31 The point remains, however, that matters proceeded
as far as they did only because the company and the prosecutors
were able to state the problem in property rather than in free
speech terms.
The second example involves a famous figure's invocation of a
property doctrine in an attempt to protect his desire for personal
privacy.3 Like the Procter & Gamble case, this claim is the sort
of action that ordinarily wastes away if beached in the free
speech bin.w If, however, a plaintiff can convince the court that
the interest is somehow folded into a mantle of private property
rights, the identical privacy concern may receive a considerable
measure of protection.3 4
The dispute in this second example involved a lawsuit that
author J.D. Salinger initiated against his biographer, Ian Hamilton,
and Hamilton's publisher, Random House, Inc.3 Despite a high
degree of fame as a writer of the fiction that defined the expe-
rience of youth for an entire generation, Salinger avidly avoids
personal publicity.36 When Hamilton decided to write about him,
Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683,
689-90 (1980). The coverage of the Ohio statute is considerably broader than a trade
secrecy law, and the information sought to be protected by Procter & Gamble does not,
in any event, fit within the definition of a trade secret. See Egan, supra note 27, at 18.
30. See, e.g., Egan, supra note 27, at 18; James S. Hirsch & Alecia Swasy, P&G's
Directors Support Action on News Leaks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1991, at A4; James S.
Hirsch, Procter & Gamble Calls in the Law to Track News Leak, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
1991, at Al.
31. See Egan, supra note 27, at 18.
32. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 322-30.
34. See, e.g., infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text (discussing a case in which
privacy interests were protected because the offending publication made some use of the
plaintiff's unpublished letters, held to be a violation of copyright law).
35. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92.
36. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd,
811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
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Salinger, not surprisingly, was unwilling to cooperate 7 For that
reason, letters written by Salinger and deposited by their reci-
pients in university libraries were particularly crucial as a source
of information, and Hamilton drew on them in assembling a
biography titled J.D. Salinger: A Writing Life.38
Except for a small number of words, Hamilton did not quote
directly from Salinger's prose 9 Rather, he relied on it for infor-
mation, in some instances paraphrasing passages from the un-
published letters.4 The fact that the Second Circuit's finding of
infringement rested largely on these paraphrases rather than on
the small amount of literal quotations makes the question of
whether Hamilton did anything that the federal copyright law
actually proscribed at least a disputable point.41 For this reason,
37. Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 416.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 417.
40. Id.
41. The trial court found that Hamilton had made fair use of the Salinger letters within
the meaning of § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. S 107 (1988). See Salinger,
650 F. Supp. at 423. Fair use, of course, presupposes the existence of what would
otherwise constitute a copyright violation, and following the Supreme Court decision in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), any direct
quotation from an unpublished source must be subject to careful scrutiny. See infra notes
409-22 and accompanying text (discussing Harper & Row). In this case, however, the
existence of actual quoted matter seemed to be of little importance. See Salinger, 650 F.
Supp. at 426. The district court made clear that even if no fair use defense were available
for uses of unpublished works, it would have been likely to find for Hamilton and his
publisher. Id. The copying involved in this case, said Judge Leval, was so minimal that
it did not even rise to the level of an infringement. Id. at 426. The Second Circuit
reversed. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987). Interestingly, however, it too seemed relatively unconcerned about the small
number of direct quotations but rather focused mainly on the instances of paraphrasing
which, in its opinion, drew too heavily on the "art" (although not the words) of Salinger's
prose. Id. The opinions demonstrate that considerable discretion clearly existed in deciding
whether to invoke property law on Salinger's behalf.
The question of when paraphrase takes "art" and when it takes something else is a
complex one, as Shakespearean scholars could well attest. The writings of the Bard
contain many passages that could be characterized as close paraphrases. For example,
the famous passage in The Tempest where Ariel addresses his fellow spirits ("Ye elves
of hills, of standing lakes, and groves!") closely parallels a passage from Ovid's "Meta-
morphosis" ("Ye ayres and windes, ye elves of hills, of brookes and woods alone, Of
standing lakes ...."). This parallel is discussed in William Maginn, Shakespeare and
Ovid, in FOUR CENTURIES OF SHAKESPEAREAN CRITICISM 149-52 (J. Frank Kermode ed.,
1965). A recent article on the debate over the identity of the historical Shakespeare gave
several examples of the author's apparent sources. For instance, the advice Polonius gave
to Laertes in Hamlet is said to parallel quite closely precepts set out in a volume
composed by Lord Burghley. Burghley wrote, "Towards thy superiors be humble yet
generous; with thine equals familiar yet respective," and Shakespeare paraphrased (as-
suming that he did indeed use this manuscript as a source): "Be thou familiar but by no
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Salinger posed a clear choice for the court. By opting to char-
acterize Salinger's interest as one sounding in property, the
judges could do what they could not in a traditional case involving
speech: they could enjoin Hamilton's use of information.
The appellate court made some effort to explain its character-
ization of Hamilton's behavior as a taking of property rather
than as an exercise of his constitutional rights by referring to
Salinger's economic interest in safeguarding the future market
for his letters should he or his successors ever choose to publish
them.42 As the court itself acknowledged, however, the likelihood
that the biographer's use of them would diminish the dollar value
of the letters was speculative and remote.43 The property really
at issue in Salinger was his privacy, his claimed right to control
the public dissemination of information about his life and atti-
tudes .44
Salinger could, with equal logic, have stated his claim under
the tort law protecting against invasions of privacy. 5 Had Sal-
inger been forced to bring his suit directly on the ground that
an unauthorized publication of personal information had invaded
his privacy, however, he would clearly have lost. 4 The informa-
tion at issue had been communicated freely by Salinger to his
correspondents and was legitimately available to the public by
its deposit into various libraries.47 Additionally, the information
in the Hamilton book was not the sort of intimate and personal
disclosure the publication of which would shock the conscience
of an ordinary reader.48 Finally, it was about a highly newsworthy
subject.49 In short, the book contained information that tort law
could not protect without running afoul of the First Amendment.5
means vulgar . . . :' Tom Bethell, The Case for Oxford, 268 ATLANTIC MONTHLY Vol. 4,
45, 45-46 (1991). Yet it would be hard to characterize Shakespeare as a mere copyist or
to determine if what he "took" from others was their "art."
42. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
43. Id.
44. The district court opinion frankly stated that the suit was about privacy, not money.
Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 426. The Second Circuit was less direct but seems tacitly to
have agreed with Judge Leval. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92 (commenting on Salinger's
aversion to publicity); id. at 99 (straining to find that marketability of letters was
impaired).
45. Salinger wanted control over publication of information about his personal life, the
gravamen of a common law privacy action. See infra notes 322-30 and accompanying text
(discussing the common law privacy tort).
46. See infra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
47. Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 416-17.
48. Id. at 419-20 (describing the revelations).
49. Id. at 416 (describing Salinger's literary accomplishments).
50. For an interesting defense of Salinger, see Jon 0. Newman, Not the End of History:
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Because the line that separates the free speech and the speech-
as-property categories is drawn so vaguely and arbitrarily that,
in many situations, the treatment of a case is essentially up to
the discretion and sense of justice of a particular judge or jury,
faith in the assertions that the two interests are not in substantial
conflict and that property protection takes little or nothing away
from the First Amendment seems sadly misplaced. The area of
serious overlap and potential conflict, in fact, is large and seems
to be growing larger.51
Without better principles for confining the sphere of property
rules, the likely outcome is that more and more chunks of com-
municative activity will fall on the property side of the line.
Protection of speech, after all, often generates results that are
unpleasant and unfair from the perspective of the individual
plaintiff, and if the court can avoid these results in a particular
case by switching to a property analysis, its temptation to do so
is great. Furthermore, the benefits to an individual or entity of
the assignment of property rights may be easier to conceptualize
in many cases than the somewhat more nebulous and remote
individual and social benefits of protecting freedom of speech.
The very attractiveness of commodification argues for its dan-
gerousness in constitutional terms, and for the establishment of
firmer boundaries.
The friction between information as a common resource and
information as a privately controlled good is a modern legal
conflict, but it has roots deep in three centuries of legal history.52
This Article represents an attempt to understand the reasons
for the discontinuities between the two approaches to speech and
to indicate, in a preliminary way, some principles that might help
to find a path out of the existing thicket.
It begins by exploring the evolution of the assumptions and
values that presently inform the property and speech categories.
The reason for this look backward is that the attitudes and
assumptions of past judges and scholars continue to be largely
responsible for the terms in which the contemporary conflict is
framed. Much of the latitude for the expansive development on
the property side of the equation is directly attributable to the
early and quite consistently maintained intellectual partition be-
tween consideration of speech values and property values. The
The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 12, 12-17 (1989)
(suggesting that some use of an unpublished work may be permissible and that critics of
the case have overreacted to the Second Circuit's opinion).
51. See infra notes 319-79 and accompanying text (discussing competing interests of
speech and property in modern law).
52. See infra notes 53-318 and accompanying text (reviewing this history).
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result was that the interplay between the categories was barely
recognized, much less reconciled. The Article then examines the
impact of this tradition in the current century and, drawing in
particular on privacy and right to publicity cases, shows how the
theories about intellectual property that developed in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contributed to the prolifer-
ation of property rights affecting speech. Finally, the Article
attempts at least some tentative suggestions for ways to ration-
alize the analysis of the area of overlap between the categories.
I. FREE SPEECH AND "OWNED" SPEECH: ORIGINS AND
JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Speech, Property, and Liberty
The origins of the concept that ownership rights could attach
to speech took root almost simultaneously with the development
of the libertarian notions that support the claim that speech and
press should be free of constraints.3 During the same historical
era when authors like Alexander Pope and great English jurists
such as Yates, Mansfield, and Lord Camden were shaping our
modern ideas abot the source and scope of intellectual property
rights, others, such as John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,4
James Alexander,5 David Hume, and Jeremy Bentham, were
actively developing the philosophical and legal basis for a free
53. One form of speech ownership predates the origins of copyright in Anglo-American
law. Trademarks as a protected pfoperty interest trace back, in their modern incarnation,
to the medieval guilds. Historically and presently, trademarks facilitate consumer iden-
tification of the maker of a product and prevent confusion as to origin. The recognition
of rights in trademarks has occasionally created free speech problems. See San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 534-39 (1987)
(concerning the use of the name "Gay Olympics"). These problems have not been common,
however, and as a result, this Article does not address the issue of speech and property
rights as it affects trademarks. For a history of trademarks, see FRANK I. SCHECTER, THE
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING To TRADE-MARKS 19-121 (1925) and Ben-
jamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, passim (1969).
54. Trenchard and Gordon were collaborators who wrote under the pseudonym "Cato."
Their collected works, JOHN TRENCHARD, CATO'S LETTERS (1737), included several essays
on freedom of speech and press that were highly influential in the American colonies as
well as in England. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 109-14 (1985).
55. Alexander was an attorney who represented newspaper publisher Peter Zenger
and wrote the brief in Zenger's famous trial. LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 43 (1966). He authored an influential four-part essay on
freedom of speech. James Alexander, Free Speech is a Pillar of Free Government, PA.
GAZETTE, Nov. 17 - Dec. 8, 1737, reprinted in LEVY, supra, at 62.
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speech regime that ultimately culminated in the drafting and
ratification of the First Amendmente 6 Almost from the outset,
courts and commentators occasionally acknowledged that these
two lines of legal thought on expression and communication
contained within themselves the seeds of conflict,57 but they made
no serious attempt, nor found a pressing need, to reconcile the
boundaries of the liberty and the property spheres.58 More often
than not, potential discontinuities seem to have gone unnoticed. 9
One reason may have been that the struggles during the
Enlightenment to establish firm protections both for private
property rights and for the right to speak freely were part and
parcel of a greater, largely undifferentiated process by which
revolutionary thinkers engaged in reconceptualizing what had
been a hierarchical, monarchical social system.60 Their goal was
a society in which citizens, their autonomy protected by a set of
"inalienable" liberties, would be the source of civil authority.61
Representatives operating by consent of the governed and not
by some version of the divine authority of kings would exercise
government power.62 Cato, for example, wrote: "[T]he Security of
Property, and the Freedom of Speech always go together; and
in those wretched Countries where a Man cannot call his Tongue
his own he can scarce call any thing else his own. '63
No reason exists to suppose that the judges and commentators
who argued for broad and comprehensive rights to intellectual
property were unsympathetic toward freedom of speech or were
consciously seeking to check it; they were simply engaged in
another part of the comprehensive enterprise of protecting in-
dividual liberties.64 Constructing the edifice was a more pressing
concern than standing back and ensuring that the construction
would result in a wholly harmonious structure 5
56. See, e.g., LEvY, supra note 55, at 109-18, 135-36, 167-70 (discussing the roles these
scholars played in developing free speech principles).
57. See infra notes 112-39 and accompanying text.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 112-39.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 93-109.
60. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
61. Typically excepted from protection, of course, were enormous groups-women,
African-Americans, often the poor-whose status as "citizens" was ambiguous or worse.
62. For an interesting discussion of property as an element of liberty, see Leonard W.
Levy, Property as a Human Right, 5 CONST. COMm. 169, 174 (1988).
63. Cato, Of Freedom of Speech, N.Y. WEEKLY J., Feb. 18, 1734, reprinted in LEVY,
supra note 55, at 11-12.
64. See infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
65. Also, as will be discussed later, freedom of speech and press may have been
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In contemporary parlance, free speech ranks high in the dis-
course on civil liberties, whereas discussion about the protection
of private property carries with it a more conservative and
backward-looking air.66 Reliable protection in the realm of prop-
erty is nevertheless a crucial element in stabilizing the distri-
bution of power between individuals and the state.6 7 In an era
when property was largely thought of as a privilege dispensed
and withdrawn at the will of monarchs, reconceptualizing prop-
erty as an individual right was a necessary condition for the
basic transformation to more democratic forms of government.6 9
John Locke provided that alternative foundation in the second
volume of his Two Treatises on Civil Government.7" Locke argued
that individuals obtained property rights, not through the divine
(and capricious) grace of kings, but through transformation by
their own labor of that which was originally part of the commons
in nature.71 The purpose of the social contract by which govern-
ment is legitimately empowered, he wrote, was to protect the
property vested ab initio in individuals by dint of their own
efforts.72 Whatever the lasting influence of Locke's theories in
other areas, they had, and continue to have, a powerful effect in
intellectual property73 and did much to legitimate the belief that
ownership rights in speech originated deep in natural law and
resounded with moral authority. 74
Locke, however, was not concerned in any obvious way with
the problem of free speech.75 Although courts and legislators
ardently supported in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but First Amendment
doctrinal development has been largely a product of this century. See infra notes 137-39
and accompanying text. Intellectual property became a more fully elaborated body of law
at a far earlier date.
66. See Levy, supra note 62 passim (discussing the relation between property and
liberty interests).
67. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964) (stating
that "property guards the troubled boundary between individual men and the state").
68. See ALLEN R. BROWN, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 71-83 (1973) (describing the
granting of real property under feudal system).
69. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 67, at 772 (discussing the interplay of property and
democracy).
70. 2 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT SS 24-51 (1924). For a discussion
of Locke's property theory as a form of civil rights protection, see Levy, supra note 62,
at 175.
71. 2 LOCKE, supra note 70, §§ 26-51.
72. Id. S§ 95-122.
73. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
294 (1988) (explaining Lockeian influence on modern intellectual property).
74. Id. at 297-329.
75. See LEVY, supra note 54, at 99.
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might look to Locke for guidance if the claim was stated in
property terms, they would look to quite different sources if
asked to think about a problem as one concerning rights of speech
and press.
B. Speech as a Free and Public Good
The origins of the Free Speech Clause and of modern intellec-
tual property law derived from the same factual as well as the
same temporal matrix: government censorship.7 6 Laws prohibiting
seditious libels against government officials existed in Britain
since 1275, 7 but serious debate about the propriety of such
regulation did not begin until the advent of printing.78 In the
sixteenth century, the British Crown augmented the law against
seditious libels with a scheme of prior licensing.79 Manuscripts
could legally be published only if they were first submitted for
approval of their content.80 Both unlicensed publications and
spoken words could be punished as seditious by the Star Chamber
if they were deemed to have a tendency to discredit the govern-
ment or the church 8' Truth or falsity was irrelevant to a finding
of sedition. 2
Although Parliament abolished the formal system of prior
restraints in England in 169483 prosecution for criminal libel
remained a risk for those who spoke out against the government.8
Furthermore, licensing persisted in the American colonies into
the eighteenth century.P Vigorous prosecutions by colonial courts,
and more often by colonial legislative bodies, for seditious libel
were commonplace. 86 After the Revolutionary War, states contin-
76. See infra notes 78-88.
77. LEVY, supra note 54, at 6.
78. See LYMAN R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20-27 (1968) (dis-
cussing the impact of printing press on government censorship efforts). The printing
press was introduced in England in 1476. Id. at 20.
79. The licensing scheme, which also ultimately gave rise to the copyright system, is
further discussed in infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
81. FRANCIS L. HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 85, 105 (Garland Publishing 1978) (1812).
82. The doctrine that accurate speech could constitute *a seditious libel dates to a
decision by the Star Chamber known as Case de Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251
(K.B. 1605).
83. L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21
(1987).
84. See HOLT, supra note 81, at 85-120.
85. See LEVY, supra note 55, at 29-30, 170-72.
86. The history of censorship and seditious libel in the United States and England is
discussed in detail in LEVY, supra note 55.
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ued the practice of prosecuting seditious libel,8 and, for a brief
period, the federal government prosecuted seditious libel by
means of the Sedition Act of 1798.P
As a result of this history, most of the early writings about
freedom of speech focused upon problems of prior restraints and
the punishment by the government of speech critical of it or
damaging to its interests. 9 Insulation of this sort of speech from
official sanction was seen, as were protections for private prop-
erty rights, as securing a changed relationship between citizen
and government.9 A sovereign citizen was entitled to expect the
government to respect and guarantee free speech as a right
rather than as a revocable privilege and also to respect the
freedom to criticize the officials who owed their power to the
citizenry.91
In this context, it is scarcely surprising that virtually all the
early writing on free speech in England and America before and
immediately after the American Revolution focused on the rela-
tionship between government and its citizen critics or on ex-
pression in the context of religious belief-a matter closely related
to governance at that time because separation of church and
state was not yet an accomplished fact.9 2 Commentators gave
little explicit attention to the sources from which the stuff of
protected discourse could be drawn.
A careful reading of historical sources suggests that the ear-
liest speech theorists assumed without elaboration that infor-
mation and ideas were a "common"' and that speakers could
draw not only on their own "unique" insights but also on the
contributions of others.94 These theorists did not seem to antici-
pate that those who wished to incorporate someone's ideas into
their own criticisms of the government or the church or who
wished to draw upon what they could observe directly about the
lives and thinking of others would first need to bargain with an
87. See LEVY, supra note 55, at 177-83.
88. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired pursuant to Act S 4 on March 3, 1801).
89. See LEVY, supra note 54, at 309-49 (discussing seminal free speech writings).
90. Id. at 310-11.
91. Id. at 293-94.
92. John Locke was a vigorous advocate of freedom of speech about religion, as was
Roger Williams. See id. at 26, 92-93, 97-100, 152.
93. A "common" is a resource "[b]elonging or shared equally by more than one."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (6th ed. 1990).
94. The notion that information was a shared resource which all were encouraged to
draw from and add to was commonplace by the end of the eighteenth century. See infra
notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
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owner for that right.95 What Justice Holmes later referred to as
a marketplace of ideas presumably was conceived of as a place
of free exchange, not of economic or contractual transactions.96
The writings of John Milton contain some basis for this reading.
In arguing against the government licensing of books, he empha-
sized the importance of allowing a free exchange between author
and reader of a multiplicity of ideas and opinions as part of the
quest for knowledge and understanding. 97 Milton did not write
as if the exchanges he envisioned resulted in a unidirectional
flow of information from an "originator" to an audience of passive
receptors; instead, he stated that "[w]here there is mbch desire
to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing,
many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the
making."98 In his Theologico-Political Treatise,9 Spinoza similarly
spoke of the desirability of unregulated "speculation" regarding
religion, science, philosophy, and the arts-a state of affairs that
presupposes free exchange and use of one another's work and
thought.100
The writings of the prominent seventeenth century scholar,
Robert Burton, support the concept that the desirability of such
use was a widely shared premise.1 1 In his masterwork, The
Anatomy of Melancholy,0 2 Burton instructed his readers to expect
his treatise to be but an assimilation of the work of his prede-
95. See id.
96. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. JOHN MILTON, AEREOPAGITICA, in 32 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 381,
405-06 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds., William Benton 1952) (1664).
98. Id. at 406. Milton, however, did not expect entire freedom to use another's work;
he commented that each person would certainly have the right to his "copy," meaning
that the right to publish a specific work would remain exclusive. Id. at 411-12.
99. BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE, in A THEOLOGICO-POLITI-
CAL TREATISE AND A POLITICAL TREATISE 13 (R.H.M. Elwes, trans., Dover Publications,
Inc. 1951) (1883).
100. Id. at 257-66.
101. The comfort with borrowing from others' works can be seen from the freedom
with which Shakespeare drew upon earlier sources for the plots of his dramas. Discussing
Shakespeare's borrowings, one Elizabethan scholar has written:
We who are cut off... from that great tradition in which Shakespeare was
bred can realize only with difficulty how many thoughts and even images
came to his audience with the pleasure not so much of discovery as of
recognition, proverbial maxims and moral sentiments, not newer than the
familiar stories which he took over for his plots.
F.P. Wilson, SHAKESPEARE'S READING, in FOUR CENTURIES OF SHAKESPEARIAN CRITICISM
220 (J. Frank Kermode ed., 1965).
102. ROBERT BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY (Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith,
eds., Tudor Publishing Co. 1955) (1628).
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cessors, but he defended himself as doing that which is common
to all authors.103 He added, "Though there were many Giants of
old in Physick and Philosophy, yet I say with Didacus Stella: A
dwarf standing on the shoulders of a Giant may see farther than
a Giant himself; I may likely add, alter, and see farther than my
predecessors."104
In the United States, one of the more explicit recognitions of
the need for a common from which all are free to draw is found
in the work of an American writer whose treatise on free speech
legal historian Leonard Levy referred to as a "preeminent Amer-
ican classic."'' 0 This author, Tunis Wortman, spoke of knowledge
as:
a general fund, of which all have a right to participate: it is a
capital which has the peculiar property of increasing its stores
in proportion as they are used. We are entitled to pursue every
justifiable method of increasing our perceptions and invigor-
ating our faculties. We are equally entitled to communicate
our information to others.08
Certainly, as free speech theory evolved in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the idea of a common became imbedded
in the formal jurisprudence of the First Amendment.0 7 Gradually
freeing themselves from the traditions of seditious libel, courts
and commentators began to adopt a view that the Constitution
protected opinion and accurate speech. 08 In doing so, they adopted
a broad rhetoric that seemed to recognize a right to draw upon
a vast common of ideas and information. As one scholar wrote,
"[C]onstitutional liberty of speech and of the press . . . implies
103. Id. at 19-20.
104. Id. at 20.
105. LEvy, supra note 54, at 332.
106. TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY OF
THE PRESS 140-41 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1800). Further discussion of the role of exchange
of ideas and information as the social basis for intellectual progress may be found in i&
at 31-46.
107. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
108. As noted earlier, see supra note 82 and accompanying text, at one time both
accurate and false speech were proscribed under the law of seditious libel. Case de
Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (K.B. 1605). A major chapter in the development
of modern free speech doctrine had to do with the evolution of protection for truth. For
a discussion of this history, see generally LEVY, supra note 54, at 127-30 (discussing the
use of truth as a defense during the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century);
John Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295 (1958) (discussing the
history, present theory, and practice of criminal libel).
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a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen may
please," so long, presumably, as the speech was neither libelous
nor obscene. 0 9
During this period the United States Supreme Court was
largely silent on the subject of constitutional protections for
speech. Its modern opinions on speech, however, are generally
consistent with the approach to information and ideas as a com-
mon. Currently, when the Court examines a case as a free speech
problem, the Court permits neither the government nor a private
party"0 to interfere with the uninhibited dissemination of ideas
or factually correct information in the possession of the speaker,
except under extraordinary circumstances."'
Early judges and commentators did not ignore or deny the
importance of information as a common good when they turned
their attention from free speech to intellectual property. 2 In
fact, many influential scholars in the early development of copy-
right clearly acknowledged the value of maintaining free access
to ideas, information, and expression."3 Important early cases
such as Millar v. Taylor"4 and Donaldson v. Beckett" 5 contain
discussions of the importance of the common.
For example, one reason that Justice Yates objected to recog-
nition of a perpetual common law copyright in Millar was the
109. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 422 (Da Capo Press
1972) (1868); see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905)
("The truth may be uttered and printed in reference to the life, character, and conduct
of individuals whenever it is necessary to the full exercise of the right to express one's
sentiments on any and all subjects that may be proper matter for discussion.").
110. The Supreme Court has found that states may not make causes of action available
to private individuals when they have the effect of restraining speech in violation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and press. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 526 (1989) (holding right of private plaintiff to sue for invasion of privacy limited by
First Amendment); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (holding
state common law of libel cannot violate First Amendment).
111. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (prohibiting
punishment of newspaper that published name of juvenile defendant in violation of state
law); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing
to enjoin publication of stolen classified government documents). In Daily Mail, Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, said that "state action to punish the publication
of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Daily Mail, 443 U.S.
at 102.
112. See infra notes 319-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions
modern property law-based cases have carved out of the free speech common.
113. An important discussion of this common, known in copyright parlance as the
"public domain," can be found in Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965
(1990).
114. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
115. 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. 953 (1774).
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potential for such a permanent monopoly to lead to the total
suppression of valuable works.116 Yates worried that granting an
owner "an entire dominion" over a work would cut against the
socially desirable policy of encouraging learning." 7 When the
House of Lords considered the claim of perpetual property rights
in Donaldson, the statements of Lord Chief Justice De Grey118
and of Lord Camden" 9 expressed similar sentiments.
Much of their concern obviously arose from a lively fear of the
consequences of overbroad monopolies. 120 In common with those
early judicial opinions on the common law of intellectual property,
the first copyright laws in England and the United States clearly
appreciated the intellectual importance to the public at large of
not allowing copyright to put undue limitations upon the ability
to borrow, build upon, and refine prior ideas and expression. 2'
According to nineteenth century commentary, the property
interest of the individual creator did not include a right to
monopolize "thoughts, or .. . the expression of them."'1  In his
Equity Jurisprudence, Justice Story wrote:
Language is common to all; and, in the present advanced state
of literature, and learning, and science, most species of literary
works must contain much which is old and well known, mixed
up with something which perhaps is new, peculiar, and origi-
nal .... The difficulty here is to distinguish what belongs to
the exclusive labors of a single mind, from what are the
116. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 249-50 (opinion of Yates, J.).
117. Id.
118. De Grey worried that perpetual copyright would lead to "extravagant" prices for
books and, worse, would allow the author or his successor "an absolute controul [sic] over
his ideas when published. . . .he may recal [sic] them, destroy them, extinguish them,
and deprive the world of the use of them ever after." Donaldson v. Beckett, 17 PARL.
HIST. ENG. 953, 991 (1774).
119. Camden stated:
If there be any thing in the world common to all mankind, science and
learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as free and
general as air or water. They forget their Creator, as well as their fellow
creatures, who wish to monopolize his noblest gifts and greatest benefits.
Why did we enter into society at all, but to enlighten one another's minds,
and improve our faculties, for the common welfare of the species?
Id. at 999 (opinion of Lord Camden).
120. See supra notes 118-19 (revealing De Grey's fears of the monopoly's effect on
publishing and Camden's concern that the monopoly would stifle the spread of knowledge).
121. See infra notes 272-88 and accompanying text for an introduction to early copyright
ideology.
122. 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE S 940 (8th ed. 1861).
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common sources of the materials of the knowledge, used by
all."2
He recognized that only the former, and not the latter, could be
the subject of private property.
Copyright statutes originally drew this line by limiting pro-
tection to a comparatively brief period of time124 and extending
it only to the specific combination of words or precise form
expressed by the author.125 So long as infringement could be
accomplished only by republishing the author's actual expres-
sion, Story's distinction between the sphere of property and
the common was comparatively easy to understand and apply.126
As the property right began to protect against works deriva-
tive of, rather than identical to, the original, however, the
problem of defining the "expression" that was properly owned
became more complex. 27 Courts, nevertheless, did try to main-
tain distinctions by holding that ideas 128 and facts 29 could never
be subjects of copyright.
123. Id.
124. The original Parliamentary English copyright statute provided protection to au-
thors and assignees for 14 years, with a possible renewal for an additional 14 years.
Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
125. The original English and American copyright statutes protected authors solely
against unauthorized reprinting of a copyrighted work, interpreted in the early years of
copyright to mean exact reduplication. See infra notes 283-91 and accompanying text.
126. The problem of direct but partial copying of expression occupied an uncomfortable
middle ground between an unauthorized republication and the making of an abridgment.
Faced with such a case, Justice Story set out a series of tests for deciding when partial
uses were permissible, including most prominently the effect of the copying on the first
author's economic interest in the original. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). This analysis was widely adopted, and ultimately the so-called
"fair use doctrine" was codified in the 1976 version of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. S 107
(1988).
127. A commentator, writing in the last quarter of the 19th century, struggled to
express the more modern standard for recognizing piracy as follows:
The true test of piracy . . . is not whether a composition is copied in the
same language or the exact words of the original, but whether in substance
it is reproduced; not whether the whole, but whether a material part, is
taken. In this view of the subject, it is no defence of piracy that the work
entitled to protection has not been copied literally; that it has been translated
into another language; that is has been dramatized; that the whole has not
been taken; that it has been abridged; that it is reproduced in a new and
more useful form. The controlling question always is, whether the substance
of the work is taken without authority.
EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 385 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1879). For a
later, often-cited effort by Judge Learned Hand to explain the idea-expression distinction,
see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
128. The United States Supreme Court made the distinction between expression and
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The fact that courts incorporated these limitations, as well as
others such as the fair use doctrine, 13 0 into copyright could be
taken as evidence that courts were actively attempting to define
and preserve separate spheres for copyright and First Amend-
ment values. These limitations, however, probably reflected co-
pyright's own, more instrumental concern for the appropriate
form of trade regulation policy.1 1 The goal of copyright was to
achieve a preferred quantum of intellectual goods for the public
benefit rather than to pursue the rights-based autonomy concerns
that are important in the context of civil liberties. 13 2
Some contrary evidence suggests that the limitations were
intended to be rights-protective. For example, Lord Effingham
explicitly stated that the primary argument against recognizing
perpetual copyright was that it would infringe freedom of the
press.' -3 He proceeded to give as an example of the sort of
problem that concerned him one that, as it turned out, is similar
to some cases that have actually arisen in modern copyright; he
hypothesized that a government minister could staunch criticism
of himself by buying up the publication rights in a pamphlet,
printing a handful of copies, and then suppressing the copies. 134
the underlying idea a matter of formal doctrine in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05
(1879) (holding that copyright in book setting out new system of bookkeeping extends to
the description, not to the system itself). This principle is now codified in 17 U.S.C.A.
S 102(b) (West Supp. 1991), a provision that states copyright does not extend to "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery."
129. See, e.g., Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 F. 797, 798-99 (7th Cir.
1921) (distinguishing in news article between copyrightable literary expression and un-
copyrightable factual content). For an interesting discussion of this distinction, see
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250-51 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
130. See supra note 126 (discussing the development and application of the fair use
doctrine).
131. See infra notes 273-318 and accompanying text (discussing public benefit as ra-
tionale for the incentive theory of copyright).
132. See id.
133. Donaldson v. Beckett, 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. 953, 1003 (1774).
134. Id. One of the best known fair use cases, Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), involved such an
attempt. The purchaser, however, was not a government official. Id. at 304. Instead,
Rosemont represented the interests of Howard Hughes. In his concurring opinion, Judge
Lumbard raised the strong suspicion that Hughes was attempting to use his copyright
to suppress any new biographies. Id. at 311-13 (Lumbard, J., concurring). Somewhat
similar considerations exist in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d. Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987), and New Era Publications Int'l, APS v. Henry Holt Co., 884
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990), a case that involved the
unauthorized biography of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard. Salinger is discussed at
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On the whole, however, direct expression of free speech con-
cerns was scant, and intellectual property law, despite expres-
sions of concern over preserving a speech common, expanded
considerably from its modest early form during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, encompassing progressively greater
quantities and kinds of activity. 35 During that time, First Amend-
ment jurisprudence remained comparatively quiescent, develop-
ing little new territory beyond that occupied by the dispute over
seditious libel.13 6
As a result, judges and commentators paid scant attention to
possible conflicts between speech and property rights. History
seems to have allowed legal thinkers of the time simply to
assume, without the need for searching analysis, that intellectual
property law did not poach on the territory of free speech.13 7
Also, the comparatively nascent state of First Amendment
doctrine'3 made it unlikely that the "miscreant" in an intellectual
property case commonly would look to that law in shaping any
arguments or defense. As a result, intellectual property could
expand its realm in a more or less self-contained way with its
own set of values, whereas free speech doctrine, the laggard, lay
still, awaiting that great spurt of energy that occurred only in
the present century. 39
C. The Evolution of Intellectual Product into Property
A highly developed notion of property rights in the intangible
product of the human intellect began to emerge in England early
supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
Although Lord Effingham's hypothetical might appear somewhat far-fetched at first
glance, one of the major problems with perpetual copyright in unpublished manuscripts
turned out to be the ability of owners, often family members of the author, to use those
rights to bar access to the papers of important people for very long periods. Today in
the United States, common law copyright has been abolished, and works are subject to
protection for limited times, usually dating from the time they are fixed in tangible form.
17 U.S.C. § 302-303 (1988).
135. See infra notes 140-318 and accompanying text.
136. See LEvy, supra note 54, at 282-349 (discussing the development of free speech
during the 18th and 19th centuries).
137. See Patterson, supra note 83, at 33-35 (discussing why courts did not think
copyright and free speech rights were inconsistent).
138. See id at 33.
139. Free speech jurisprudence in the United States began its modern development at
the end of World War I in such landmark decisions as Abrams v. United States, 290 U.S.
616 (1919), and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), both involving violations of
a statute prohibiting interference with the war effort.
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in the eighteenth century.140 Before that time, members of the
Stationers Company enjoyed exclusive "rights" to print particular
books, but largely as an artifact of the system of state censor-
ship.14' In the interest of ensuring the political and religious
orthodoxy of books, the Crown limited the legitimate publishing
trade to members of the Company, who in turn could publish
only manuscripts that the Crown licensed.4 2 The Company kept
a registry of which member was entitled to print a particular,
licensed work.14 This system provided members of the Company,
not the creators of the works, with monopoly rights and for that
reason had little affinity with modern intellectual property
schemes. 4 Under this form of economic ordering, authors were
acknowledged only in that printers customarily obtained their
manuscripts by purchasing them from their creators.
145
When censorship by licensing ended, 4 the expectations of
exclusivity enjoyed by the printing trade were thrown into dis-
array. 47 Without the State to limit access to the business of
printing, no authority supported the continuation of what previ-
ously had been monopolies. Anyone with a printing press could
reproduce a work, even though someone else had registered it.
The first copyright statute in England, the Statute of Anne, 148
was passed in 1709 and reestablished order in the industry by
creating a mechanism whereby exclusive rights to make copies
of works were protected-but now for a mere fourteen-year
period, with the possibility of one renewal. 49 A second dramatic
change was that the copyright was granted in the first instance
to the author rather than the publisher.'10 The remedies provided
140. See Patterson, supra note 83, at 26-33 (discussing early development of intellectual
property theories).
141. Id. at 24.
142. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW 3-4 (1967).
143. Once a particular publisher registered a work, he obtained the exclusive right to
publish it in perpetuity. Id. at 4-5; Patterson, supra note 83, at 25.
144. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (vesting rights in the creator of a work).
145. KAPLAN, supra note 142, at 5.
146. The Licensing Act of 1662, 13 & 14 Car. II, ch. 33, expired in 1694. PATTERSON,
supra note 78, at 46.
147. See PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 106 (discussing piracy of works after the
expiration of the licensing statute).
148. Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng.).
149. Works already in print were covered for a single period of 21 years. Patterson,
supra note 83, at 25.
150. PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 145. The fact that the Statute of Anne spoke in
terms of the authors' interests in copyright is somewhat surprising because the protections
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by the Statute were not available to all but only to those who
complied with certain formal requirements. 5
In the years following the passage of the Statute of Anne,
considerable debate arose about the philosophy and purposes
behind it.152 Out of that debate evolved two divergent views of
the breadth and function of property rights in words, ideas, and
information. That history is worth a detour at this point because
it will help to explain subsequent developments crucial to the
thesis of this Article.
The courts undertook the task of elaborating a basic approach
to intellectual property in the context of two sorts of claims that
forced them to explore the reasons for a scheme that protected
authors. The first of these disputes did not arise until more than
thirty years after the passage of the Statute of Anne, and it
dealt with who was entitled to authorize the publication of
unpublished manuscripts.153 Positive law left this issue entirely
unaddressed because the focus of the Statute was on the right
to make copies, which .presupposed that a decision to publish had
already been reached. 1' The earliest reported case pitted Alex-
ander Pope against the publisher of a book of letters written by
famous authors, including Pope and Jonathan Swift. 55 Presuma-
bly, the publisher obtained the letters from the recipients; what
is clear is that the authors had not given their permission. 16
provided by the Statute came into play at the time of publication, rather than at the
creation of the work. Id. at 143-45. In fact, the entire focus of the law was on regulation
of publishing, that is, on the right to make multiple copies-a fact that is hardly
astounding, given that publishers were the constituency that lobbied for passage of the
Statute. Id. at 142. The decision of Parliament to assign the copyright in the first instance
to authors rather than publishers seems eminently sensible to modern theorists, but we
know little about the rationale of the drafters on this subject aside from the contents of
the Statute itself. Little explicit information about the policy considerations that went
into framing the Statute can be found in the literature. KAPLAN, supra note 142, at 7-9.
151. 8 Anne, ch. 19, S 11.
152. Cases dealing with questions of literary property seem to have been exceedingly
rare prior to the passage of the Statute of Anne. A summary of the cases prior to 1709
can be found in the opinion of Justice Willes in Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 207-
09 (K.B. 1769).
153. Pope v. Curl, 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 608 (Ch. 1741).
154. PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 145.
155. Pope, 26 Eng. Rep. at 608.
156. Id. Two other cases, one predating Pope and one decided in the same year, are
mentioned in Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 216 (K.B. 1769). They are Webb v. Rose
(1732) and Forrester v. Waller (1741), and their results appear consistent with Pope in
recognizing an exclusive common law right in authors to decide when and whether to
publish their works.
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The most obvious significance of the case lay in the fact that
by deciding in favor of Pope, the court acknowledged the exist-
ence of a property right in authors that did not depend solely
upon a statute.157 This right has become known as the common
law copyright. Less obvious, but equally significant, the court
also recognized the author's right as having an unusual nature.1'
Because the manuscripts at issue were letters, possession of
which Pope had voluntarily transferred to others, 59 Pope's claim
could not be successful unless the court could conceptualize his
property right as inhering in the contents of his letters rather
than in the physical stuff in which the contents were embodied.' 60
This was indeed the outcome; the court concluded that the
author's rights were in his intangible expression and remained
with him no matter who had possession of the actual manu-
script. 6' The author and not the owner of the letter therefore
had the right to decide whether to publish the work. Once
enunciated, the idea of a common law right in intangible expres-
sion was widely accepted and seems to have been noncontro-
versial.162
The second dispute was more difficult to resolve. It involved
the duration of the common law right to property in expression.63
If the right was perpetual, as argued, 1' 4 control would remain
with the author or the author's successors and assigns even after
publication and the ultimate lapse of the protections established
under the Statute of Anne. 165 The argument that intellectual
property, as any other property, is infinite in duration enjoyed
considerable initial success, most notably in the famous decision
of Millar v. Taylor.166 Its sails ultimately were trimmed, however,
in both Great Britain and the United States 67





162. See PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 168-72 (discussing the recognition of common
law copyright in Millar and the firm foothold of the idea that authors had rights based
on the act of creating a work).
163. See infra note 167.
164. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
165. 8 Anne, ch. 19.
166. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
167. In Great Britain, judicial opinion initially favored the existence of a perpetual
common law right unaffected by publication. In Millar, the court found that the publisher
of JAMES THOMPSON, THE SEASONS (James A. Sambrook ed., 1981) (1727), retained exclusive
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The judiciary in both countries eventually concluded that the
common law protected only unpublished works; once works were
published, property rights extended only so far and so long as
the legislature dictated.1' The result was that, philosophically
and technically, Anglo-American law took a bifurcated approach
to literary property.1 9 Common law copyright could be perpetual,
but only if the work was not published; a published work, how-
ever, remained exclusive property only for the statutory term.170
Works not properly copyrighted at publication and those beyond
the term of statutory protection fell into the public domain and
were freely available to all for their use.'7'
In the course of resolving this issue, courts articulated two
different sets of justifications for creating private rights in
speech. 72 How broadly or how narrowly advocates argued for
the protection of information and ideas depended largely on
whether they focused primarily on the "just deserts" of the
creator or on the claims of future creators and the public at
rights to the work even after the expiration of the statutory copyright term. Millar, 98
Eng. Rep. at 202-05. The court held that the statute provided copyright owners with
additional remedies for a stated period, but was not the exclusive source of rights in
published works and did not displace rights that arose under common law. Id. at 207.
The House of Lords ultimately overturned Millar in a subsequent dispute over the same
poem. Donaldson v. Beckett, 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1156 (1774).
The situation in the United States remained ambiguous. In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 591 (1834), the Court established that copyright at the federal level was entirely
a creature of statute because federal common law did not exist. Id. at 667. Whether
individual states did or could protect works, including published writings, under common
law was a different matter. Although the majority concluded that Pennsylvania, the state
at issue in Wheaton, had not adopted common law copyright from England, the possibility
of such common law rights existing in other states or subsequently being recognized
remained. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), was a modern example of recognition
by the Supreme Court of a possible dual scheme of federal and state copyright. See id.
at 567-70 (explaining that federal copyright law does not per se preempt state copyright
law). Not until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), did federal law clearly
preempt state common law protection for copyright. Under that statute, all works
otherwise eligible for copyright, whether or not published, are covered by the federal
statute as soon as they are fixed in tangible form. 17 U.S.C. S 301 (1988). For conflicting
views on the existence of common law copyright, see Howard B. Abrams, The Historic
Foundation of American Copyright Law: E'pioding the Myth of Common Law Copyright,
29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119, 1124 (1983) (arguing that copyright is purely statutory and never
existed at common law) and DRONE, supra note 127, at 16-85 (arguing that common law
copyright did exist and that Donaldson and Wheaton were wrongly, decided).
168. DRONE, supra note 127, at 42-48.
169. Id. at 100.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 297-98.
172. See PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 181, 214-15.
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large.173 The interests particular judges favored seemed primarily
a function of how deeply or shallowly they were committed to
the precepts of John Locke.
In Millar v. Taylor,174 for example, Locke's labor theory of
property rights clearly influenced the majority's holding that an
author's property interest survived the copyright statute and
was perpetual. 75 Lord Mansfield, for example, claimed that the
source of the right derives "[firom this argument- because it is
just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own
ingenuity and labour."'17 Although Mr. Justice Willes protested
that "arguments from the supposed modes of acquiring the prop-
erty of acorns, or a vacant piece of ground in an imaginary state
of nature, are too remote"' 77 as a basis for deciding the question,
he ultimately came down on the side of Lockeian reasoning,
concluding that "[iut is certainly not agreeable to natural justice,
that a stranger should reap the beneficial pecuniary produce of
another man's work."'17s So, too, did Justice Aston, who concluded
that authors had a right to property protection for their works
because they were the product of their mental labors 79
Millar had a short life as governing law before the House of
Lords overturned it in Donaldson v. Bckett. °80 The House of
Lords held in Donaldson that the statute rather than natural law
exclusively protected published works.' 18 With its numerous lim-
itations, the copyright statute seemed to embody a quite different
conception of the source of an author's "rights."'8 2 Rather than
responding primarily to some moral claim by authors to their
creations, the legislation in England and later in the United
States provided a system of economic incentives to encourage
creation, but more to benefit the public than to reward the
author 83 The statute granted control over copying only to the
extent necessary to maximize the flow of original works, and no
173. See Abrams, supra note 167, at 1120-23 (discussing competing values in copyright
law).
174. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
175. Id. at 218, 229, 257; see also DRONE, supra note 127, at 28-31 (discussing Millar).
176. Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 252.
177. Id. at 218.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 221.
180. 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. 953 (1774).
181. Id. at 958, 1003.
182. See KAPLAN, supra note 142, at 6-8.
183. Id. at 22-25.
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further.18 4 In its strictest form, this approach viewed property
rights as potentially in derogation of public policy unless justified
by a stringent standard of need.185 Because no litmus for need
existed in the eighteenth century, and certainly none exists now,
the incentive theory ultimately became, as we shall see later, as
broad an avenue for an expanding vision of property rights as
the Lockeian approach.
In the short run, however, the derivation of intellectual prop-
erty rights from natural law was the more congenial route to
expansion. For example, even though the majority of the Lords
in Donaldson agreed that, as to published works covered by the
statute, Parliament's approach must be respected, they were
nonetheless firmly of the view that the act of creation endowed
creators with a natural right to exclusive possession of the
intangible product of their minds.18 .
This attitude crossed the Atlantic intact. The states passed a
number of copyright laws prior to federal copyright that referred
to the innate property rights of creators.lar Even though federal
law followed the English model, 18 and American courts adopted
the same interpretation of its reach as the English had in Don-
aldson,'8 9 discussions of intellectual property and its kin in the
United States resonated with references to natural law and to
Lockeian labor theory. Justice M'Lean, for example, wrote for
184. See PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 143-50, 180-83.
185. Id. at 198-202.
186. Donaldson, 17 PARL. HiST. ENG. at 971-1003. Some, however, took this moral claim
to support only a narrow protection of literary creations. Under this approach, the
contents of a book (as opposed to the paper and ink in which those contents were
embodied) were inherently unsuitable as an object of natural rights in property. Lord
Camden, for example, in his famous address to the House of Lords, suggested that a
person's natural claim to his ideas and sentiments evaporates upon utterance when he
stated:
Why, in the first place, say the respondents, every man has a right to his
ideas. Most certainly, every man who thinks has a right to his thoughts
while they continue his; but here the question again returns; when does he
part with them? When do they become publici juris? While they are in his
brain no one indeed can purloin them; but what if he speaks, and lets them
fly out in private or public discourse? Will he claim the breath, the air, the
words in which his thoughts are clothed?
Id at 997.
Lord Camden was clear that if those ideas were expressed on paper, the paper and
ink were property, but he entertained serious doubts that the content itself could be so
denominated. Id. For a similar opinion, see the remarks of Baron Eyre. Id. at 972.
187. See PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 186-90.
188. I& at 180.
189. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 666-67 (1834).
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the majority in Wheaton v. Peters90 that the act of creation in
and of itself gave authors a property right, even though the
intervention of the copyright laws subsequently limited that
interest to any profit generated by "the transfer of [their] man-
uscripts, or in the sale of [their] works, when first published."'19
Over time, legislators tended to conflate incentive-based and
natural law theory in the attempt to justify the broadening of
the protection offered by successive redraftings of the federal
statutory scheme 92 In the cases in which information and intel-
lectual products were subject purely to common law, the labor
theory of property continued to predominate. 93
D. The Profits of Ingenuity: The Impact of the Labor Theory
It was one thing to find under natural law that individuals
were entitled to property in the fruits of their intellectual labors;
it was quite another to construct from this generality definitions
of what constituted intellectual labor and of the rights that flowed
from it. Using labor theory, the earliest common law cases did
no more than establish the limited principle that the author of a
commercially valuable work was the proper party to control the
timing of its exploitation through publication. 194 Had Locke's
principles led courts no further, this Article would have far less
to discuss. Of course, such was not the case.
During the nineteenth century, rhetoric about rights to the
product of the mind was trotted out to argue for and to explain
a continuous expansion of common law copyright and related
interests that is difficult to reconcile with free, speech values.195
As a result of this evolution, by the twentieth century, finding
any unique characteristics that distinguished information capable
of ownership from information the free use of which was pro-
tected by the First Amendment was difficult. This section de-
scribes that evolution.
Three sets of common law copyright cases developed the
groundwork for the expanding privatization of speech. The first
had to do with protection of private letters, the second with a
set of lecture notes, and the third with art works.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 657.
192. See PATTERSON,.supra note 78, at 213-16.
193. See infra notes 194-271 and accompanying text (discussing impact of labor theory).
194. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 196-261 and accompanying text.
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Early case law suggested that labor that gave rise to property
protections in speech and ideas was largely confined to that
which bore economically valuable fruits. The English Court of
Chancery initially took the position that only a "literary work"
could properly claim the protection of common law copyright,196
and that view commanded some early support, most notably in
New York.'9
The momentum of Lockeian thinking, however, as well as the
pragmatic difficulties of applying the distinction between literary
and nonliterary works, ultimately led courts to abandon the
distinction. Not atypical was the reasoning the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts applied to conclude that economic value
was irrelevant to a determination of whether an author owned
the contents of a letter.19 8 First the court noted:
It is generally recognized that one has a right to the fruits of
his labor. This is equally true, whether the work be muscular
or mental or both combined .... The labor of composing
letters for private and familiar correspondence may be trifling,
or it may be severe, but it is none the less the result of an
expenditure of thought and time. 1'
The court further explained, however, that even if Lockeian logic
had not already persuaded them of the propriety of this result,
they would nonetheless have reached the same conclusion simply
because distinguishing "literary" from "nonliterary" letters was
too difficult. 00 That distinction, they wrote, depended entirely
upon the "fluctuating . . .literary taste of the general public," 201
not on some inherent quality of the work.
The private letters cases were important not merely because
they recognized that property rights could exist both in com-
mercially valuable and commercially valueless works, but also
because, in the course of deciding them, the courts explicitly
196. Perceval v. Phipps, 35 Eng. Rep. 225, 229 (Ch. 1813).
197. See Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 318 (N.Y. 1848); Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw.
Ch. 512 (N.Y. 1842).
198. Baker v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912).
199. Id. The New York Court of Appeals voiced similar allegiance to Locke in an
earlier case involving personal letters. Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 57-58 (N.Y. 1855).
200. Baker, 97 N.E. at 111.
201. Id. A similar objection was voiced in Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 678 (Ch.
1818), in declining to follow Perceval v. Phipps, 35 Eng. Rep. 225 (Ch. 1813); see also
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (discussing property
right in letters as basis for restraining publication).
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identified a new purpose served by commodification. 202 Until then,
common law copyright was largely considered a means by which
owners could control the timing of publication.20 3 In the private
letters cases, the function of the property right was to keep
works from being published at all.20 4
Certainly, the owner of rights in a commercially valuable work
might choose never to publish it, but the expectation implicit in
reserving to the creator the fruits of her labors was that works
with a market would eventually find their way into the hands of
the public. 205 In giving noncommercial works perpetual copyright
protection, however, courts explicitly sanctioned this use of the
labor rationale to achieve permanent suppression. For example,
the New York Court of Appeals said of the author of personal
or business letters: "As owner, he has an absolute right to
suppress as well as to publish; and he is as fully entitled to the
protection and aid of the court, when suppression is his sole and
averred object, as when he intends to publish."2 6 This conclusion
was pregnant with significance for the future debate over the
proper spheres of free speech and property.
Proponents of free speech would agree that coercing someone
to speak who prefers to remain silent is not sanctioned by the
interest in freedom to exchange information.207 Nor would free
speech rights command that someone open the lock on her private
diary or give the public access to a manuscript currently under
her sole control. The use of a device such as common law
copyright to back up the individual's personal choice not to speak
under these or similar circumstances seems quite consistent with
First Amendment values. This uncontroversial form of suppres-
sion, however, was not all that the courts were permitting in
approving a property right not to communicate. Rather, under
202. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing rights of author of private
letter).
203. See supra notes 153-93 and accompanying text (discussing early common law
copyright cases).
204. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 203-05 (1890).
205. Concerned that common law copyright resulted in many valuable works remaining
permanently unavailable to the public, Congress, in the 1976 rewrite of the copyright
laws, brought all unpublished manuscripts under the statute and limited the term of their
protection. See 17 U.S.C.A. SS 102, 303 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). For a discussion of the
change, see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 138-39 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5754-55.
206. Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 58 (N.Y. 1855).
207. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (stating that First Amendment
protects not only the right to speak but also the right not to do so).
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common law copyright, owners were allowed to disclose their
thoughts by any means short of statutory "publication" without
forfeiting their power to prevent recipients from making uncon-
sented use of the communicated materials. 2 8 Also, the right to
suppress passed on to heirs and assigns for the indefinite fu-
ture 09
Although the perpetual nature of these rights was problematic
in numerous ways,210 the potential for conflict with freedom of
speech would have been minimized if all that the common law
did was protect the creator's actual expression captured in a
fixed form. The early personal letter cases were amenable to
such a limitation because they involved expression that was fixed
on paper and would-be publishers who wanted to copy them in
their original language and form. 211 In the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, however, two quite different cases, Abernethy
v. Hutchinson,2 2 decided in 1825, and Prince Albert v. Strange,213
decided in 1849, suggested that the labor theory supporting
common law copyright was sufficiently broad to encompass far
more than this narrow definition of expression.
The plaintiff in Abernethy was a surgeon who delivered a series
of medical lectures at London's St. Bartholomew's Hospital.2 4
One or more of his students took extensive notes on the lectures
and published them in the medical journal Lancet.215 Although
Abernethy said that he prepared notes prior to giving his lec-
tures, he apparently did not read from them, but rather delivered
his talks extemporaneously.2 16 By invoking common law copyright
as a source of his rights, Abernethy thus argued that the court
should extend that doctrine from writings to verbal communica-
tions that were fixed and published by members of his audience.217
The Lord Chancellor stated that Abernethy's claim of a common
208. A modern example of the extent to which a holder of a common law copyright
could go in communicating the contents of a work to others without losing his perpetual
rights over it is provided by King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). In that case, the Rev. Martin Luther King was held not to have "published" his
famed "I Have a Dream" speech either by distributing it in a press kit or by delivering
it to a huge national audience via radio and television. Id. at 106-08.
209. See DRONE, supra note 127, at 102-04.
210. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 155-62, 196-209 and accompanying text.
212. 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (Ch. 1825).
213. 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (V.C. 1849).
214. Abernathy, 47 Eng. Rep. at 1313.
215. Id. at 1313-14.
216. Id. at 1315.
217. Id. at 1314-15.
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law copyright in his oral communications raised a question "of
mighty importance,218 although he ultimately concluded that the
question was more appropriate for a court of law rather than of
equity.219 Instead, the Lord Chancellor gave Abernethy injunctive
relief on the alternative theory that ticket holders entered into
an implied contract not to publish the surgeon's spoken comments
for profit. 0
The decision in Abernethy may not have decided the "impor-
tant" question, but the opinion provided fodder for later cases in
which plaintiffs sought common law property protection for con-
versation and other ephemeral creations.Y1 Warren and Brandeis
drew on the case to support their thesis that the existing common
law implicitly protected the individual's right to privacy.2 Aber-
nethy also bore more direct fruit in the subsequent century, most
prominently in Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc.,2  a
1968 decision of the New York Court of Appeals. Hemingway
and a number of other cases adopted the view that common law
copyright could indeed attach to the spoken word.2 Although,
in light of the current Copyright Act, reference to common law
copyright has nearly disappeared from the case law as a source
of rights, courts are quite capable of commodifying unfixed forms
of expression by using instead such doctrines as the right of
publicity and privacy protections against appropriations.
218. Id. at 1317.
219. Id. at 1316.
220. Id. at 1317-18.
221. See infra notes 223-61 and accompanying text.
222. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 207-13.
223. 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968). The case involved an attempt to enjoin a revealing
biography of author Ernest Hemingway, in part on the claim that quotation of Heming-
way's verbal comments violated his common law property rights. The court found that
spoken words might well be a form of property, at least if "the speaker indicate[d] that
he intended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of speech,
that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement and that he wished to exercise control
over its publication." Id. at 256. The court held the property right was not violated in
this case, however, because evidence of the requisite intent was lacking. Id.
224. See Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., 219 N.Y.S. 196, 198-99 (Sup. Ct. 1926). Marvin was
decided two years after Hemingway. The federal district court took the position that
comedian Lenny Bruce held a property right in his conversations, and this interest was
one of the grounds the court used to support the issuance of an injunction against
continued performance of the film Dirtymouth. Marvin, 319 F. Supp. at 1273, 1277. In
Jenkins, the court cited Abernethy in support of its ruling that the plaintiff's oral remarks
were covered by common law copyright. Jenkins, 219 N.Y.S. at 198. The defendant
newspaper violated her property rights by publishing an interview containing her ideas
for articles on New York debutante parties even though plaintiff subsequently decided
not to write them. Id. at 198-99.
225. See infra notes 331-53 and accompanying text.
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Decided in 1849, Prince Albert v. Strange26 provided yet an-
other avenue through which common law courts, relying on
Locke's labor theory, were able to nudge outward the boundaries
of property in information.m Queen Victoria and Prince Albert
drew and made pictorial engravings as a hobby.22 They sent
some of their engraved plates to a printer to make impressions
for their own personal use and enjoyment.2 An employee of the
printer, however, surreptitiously ran off copies for himselfm and
these ultimately came into the defendant's possession.PI
Proposing to mount a show of the engravings, Strange pub-
lished a catalogue describing his holdings.2 2 The Prince then
sued, not merely to recover the prints but also to enjoin distri-
bution of the catalogue.2 The defendant argued that no law
existed that would prevent him from describing to the public,
either orally or in writing, what he himself knew about the
nature of property held by another person.2
Not surprisingly, given the identity of the protagonists, the
court held to the contrary.P5 One ground for the decision was
breach of trust or implied contractP 6 More interesting for our
purposes, however, was the alternative ground for the ruling:
violation of common law copyright.27 The court stated that this
doctrine created broad property rights.m Not only did the doc-
trine give the Prince the legal power to withhold the art itself
from public display or distribution, but the court also found that
it enabled him to prevent so much as a description of the works
from reaching the public without his consent.2
The Vice-Chancellor gave various justifications for that posi-
tion, including the possible prejudicial effect of a premature
disclosure of a creator's plan for his work and the need to
226. 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (V.C. 1849).
227. See id. at 311-12.
228. Id. at 293.
229. Id. at 295.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 297.
232. Id. at 294.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 299.
235. Id. at 321.
236. Id. at 314-15, 320.
237. Id. at 312-13.
238. Id. at 312.
239. Id. at 312-13. Under the Vice-Chancellor's reading of the law of common law
copyright, a review of an unpublished manuscript, for example, would be an infringement
of the property right. I& at 311.
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safeguard the feelings of the plaintiff.O The breadth of the
protection was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to maximize
the privacy of the royal family. This fact, however, did not
prevent the decision from being broadly influential, both in the
subsequent history of copyright protection for unpublished works
and also in the cases that developed protection for individual
personality out of the property rights attached to literary or
artistic works. 1
Putting these three lines of cases together, one can readily
see their implications. By the close of the nineteenth century,
judges and commentators believed the labor theory justified a
property right not only in the product of the human mind as
embodied in tangible form, but also in virtually any mental
"creation," however ephemeral or whatever its form, as well as
in mere information about the creation.?2 A plaintiff could claim
common law copyright without showing that her creation pos-
sessed monetary value or that she had any intent ever to exploit
it. The doctrine seemed as well suited to protect personal inter-
ests as it was to deal with more traditional forms of intellectual
product.13
Unquestionably, the inclusion of purely personal interests within
the property rubric was not accidental. Judges saw the possibility
and gravitated to it.244 Justice Story, an extremely influential
figure in the development of intellectual property law,245 was
blunt about the policies served by allowing personal letters to
enjoy the status of property. Publication of such documents
240. Id.
241. See DRONE, supra note 127, at 101-15 (discussing protections of common law
copyright).
242. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 198-204 (discussing reach of common
law copyright and arguing that privacy interests were protected by it).
243. Id. at 205.
244. One example is Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818). In opting to
recognize a common law copyright in private, nonliterary letters, Chancellor Eldon wrote:
I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written in
confidence, or because the publication of them may wound the feelings of
the Plaintiff; but if mischievous effects of that kind can be apprehended in
cases in which this Court has been accustomed, on the ground of property,
to forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon the jurisdiction
which my predecessors have exercised, and refuse to forbid it.
Id. at 678; see also Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49, 53-55 (N.Y. 1855) (emphasizing that
a property right must be violated for court to take jurisdiction); Prince Albert v. Strange,
64 Eng. Rep. 293, 309-12 (V.C. 1849) (finding interests of author of unpublished work
protected by common law copyright include reputation, privacy, and seclusion).
245. See KAPLAN, supra note 142, at 27.
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without the author's permission, he said, "[SItrikes at the root of
all that free and mutual interchange of advice, opinions, and
sentiments between relatives, and friends, and correspondents,
which is so essential to the well-being of society and to the spirit
of liberal courtesy and refinement. It may involve whole families
in great distress." 6
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis best recognized the full
implications of applying common law copyright concepts to per-
sonal interests, and as a result of their writings,27 the preexisting
trend toward freeing intellectual property rights from their orig-
inal attachment to some physical res, like a drawing or a letter,
reached fruition.2 8 Warren and Brandeis argued that no reason
existed for distinguishing, for purposes of recognizing property
rights, between the labor that went into the creation of a work
of art or literature and the labor expended by an individual in
the conduct of her life. 9 Although, largely for remedial purposes,
they urged that privacy interests be conceptualized as personal
rather than property rights,20 the transformation was never very
sharp. Warren and Brandeis were less interested in remedying
particularized injuries than in giving individuals exclusive control
over their "inviolate personalit[ies]."251
What Warren and Brandeis denominated as the "right to be
let alone" 2 sounds very much like a common law copyright in
one's life,2 and was evidently understood in that way by the
246. STORY, supra note 122, 5 946.
247. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 193.
248. Id. at 213.
249. Id. at 207.
250. Id. For example, privacy rights, unlike property rights, are inalienable; claims for
invasion of privacy ordinarily are coextensive with the life of the claimant, and do not
survive her. See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property and
Ap'propriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 647, 666-69 (1991). For a full discussion of the
significance of the transition in Warren and Brandeis from property to personality, see
id. The right of publicity, which has evolved from the law of privacy, has reverted to its
property roots by recognizing an interest that is generally agreed to be alienable and
descendible. See generally id. (discussing the right of publicity).
251. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 205. Because the authors attempted to
distance themselves from "property," they did not unambiguously justify their privacy
right on a labor theory, but they nonetheless were clearly influenced by its moral content.
Id. at 206-07.
252. Id. at 193.
253. Id. at 206. They further explained:
The circumstance that a thought or emotion has been recorded in a perma-
nent form renders its identification easier, and hence may be important from
the point of view of evidence, but it has no significance as a matter of
substantive right. If, then, the decisions indicate a general right to privacy
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courts that subsequently adopted the privacy right in the early
part of this century. Those courts were willing initially to give
plaintiffs control over whether and how others could portray
them to the public, even if objectively the portrayal was inoffen-
sive and trespassed on no especially intimate ground.
A notable example was the case of Cason v. Baskin2,e in which
the Florida Supreme Court awarded a woman nominal damages
for invasion of privacy simply because author Marjorie Rawlings
published a character sketch of her without her consent25 in the
book, Cross Creek.2e The court found that the book portrayed
Ms. Cason sympathetically and attractively, but that it nonethe-
less invaded her rights.2 7 The failure to obtain Cason's consent,
said the court-after quoting liberally from Warren and Brandeis
and other commentary 2O- made the defendant's behavior wrong-
ful, even in the absence of provable injury.29 The case reads a
little like an example of a "technical trespass," rather than a
personal injury action.
The language the Georgia Supreme Court used in the first
major decision adopting the common law right of privacy also
had a tone that owes more to property law than to modern tort
theory.260 In deciding that the plaintiff, whose photograph and
name had been used in an advertisement for insurance, had stated
a cause of action, the court wrote:
One who desires to live a life of partial seclusion has a right
to choose the times, places, and manner in which and at which
he will submit himself to the public gaze .... [T]he body of a
person cannot be put on exhibition at any time or at any place
without his consent. The right of one to exhibit himself to the
public at all proper times, in all proper places, and in a proper
manner is embraced within the right of personal liberty. The
right to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a
for thoughts, emotions, and sensations, these should receive the same pro-
tection, whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in
attitudes, or in facial expression.
Id.
254. 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944).
255. Id, at 247, 254 (finding Ms. Cason to have stated a prima facie case of invasion of
privacy); see also Cason v. Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635, 640 (Fla. 1947) (awarding Ms. Cason
nominal damages after finding Ms. Rawlings' defense of newsworthiness insufficient).
256. MARJORIE K. RAWLINGS, CROSS CREEK 48-55 (1942).
257. Cason, 20 So. 2d at 247.
258. See id. at 247-53.
259. Id. at 253.
260. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
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person may see fit, when his presence in public is not demanded
by any rule of law, is also embraced within the right of personal
liberty.261
Over all, the labor theory of Locke seemed to provide a
convenient rhetorical device for courts eager to support the
individual's demand for control over both the products of his
thought and the manner of presenting his public persona. The
theory, however, did not provide a set of analytic principles with
built-in limitations. The fault, of course, may not have been with
Locke's theories but rather with the simplistic way in which they
were applied. Nevertheless, at least some question remains as to
how readily Locke's philosophical insights could have been refined
to provide the limits on commodification that would reconcile it
with the First Amendment.?e2
Locke's own theory did, of course, suggest certain boundaries:
in a state of nature, individual labor could appropriate wealth
from the common without infringing on the opportunities of
others when there was "still enough and as good left" and when
that which was appropriated could be used productively rather
than be wasted.m Some commentators have suggested that Locke's
limiting principles, which he discussed in terms of land and raw
materials in a state of nature, can be translated to information
and intellectual product in a mature society by preserving ideas
for public use and allowing property interests only in expres-
sion.2 4 Whether this approach could result in a constitutionally
261. Id. at 70. Other early cases also suggested a broad right to control publicity given
to one's character or facts about one's life. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.
Supp. 305, 309 (D.D.C. 1948) (finding plaintiff's right to prevent unwanted use of photo-
graphs comparable to right to prevent publication of personal letters); Reed v. Real
Detective Publishing Co., 162 P.2d 133, 138-39 (Ariz. 1945) (recognizing an apparently
unlimited privacy right to prevent unwanted publication of photographs); Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (holding cause of action for use of name exists even
though facts at issue were ones that had at one time been highly publicized).
The one significant limitation on the plaintiffs right was a defense of newsworthiness,
but early decisions took a fairly narrow view of that defense. In Binns v. Vitagraph Co.,
103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913), for example, the court found that a newsreel report about a
shipwreck was outside the privilege for newsworthy reports because the defendant had
inserted into the film a dramatic recreation of the event that, for obvious reasons, could
not be filmed live. Id- at 1110-11.
262. For example, Locke said that property rights resided in one's person as well as
one's external wealth. See infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text. Reconciling that
broad form of property with the demands of the First Amendment poses serious problems,
as the modern privacy law cases show. See infra notes 32240 and accompanying text.
263. 2 LOCKE, supra note 70, §§ 32-33.
264. See Hughes, supra note 73, at 319-23.
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more satisfactory body of common law is unclear, 65 and evidence
that it played a role in how this area actually evolved is scarce
indeed.2 66
Another problem in limiting labor-based intellectual property
doctrine is the definition of the term "labor" in the creation of
intangibles. 2 7 As the personal letters and privacy cases indi-
cate,26 the concept has proven to be nothing if not plastic. As
this reprise of the growth of common law copyright concepts
shows, the labor needed to produce casual expression or a public
persona (often mere byproducts of the act of living one's life) has
counted as heavily for purposes of property rights as the work
needed to create a work of art or elaborate a complex scientific
theory.6 9
265. This hypothesis would need considerable elaboration to be useful in the derivation
of doctrine. Anyone attempting that task would have to confront, among other issues,
the practical difficulties that inhere in making a sensible separation between ideas and
expression. The problem arises constantly in statutory copyright cases in which the ideal
expression dichotomy is regularly invoked. To return for a moment to the discussion in
the introduction, see supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text, of Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987), did Hamilton's
paraphrases of the Salinger letters take expression or merely ideas? See id- at 95; see
also Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that novel based on an
unusual fictional device used an idea and did not take expression), afj'd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d
Cir. 1979).
266. In their Article on privacy, Warren and Brandeis, supra note 204, clearly did not
recognize an idealexpression limitation, as the passage quoted supra note 253 demon-
strates.
267. The problem of defining what legitimately counts as labor for purposes of estab-
lishing property rights arises in other contexts as well. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974) (discussing the acquisition of property rights in tangible
objects by changing or adding to them).
268. See infra note 269 (discussing Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th
Cir. 1950)).
269. Property-like protections have been recognized in one's physical appearance, see
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (prohibiting
use of look-alike in advertisement), affd without opinion, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div.
1985), and other attributes, see Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461-62 (9th Cir.
1988) (finding singing style protected by common law right of publicity). Formal copyright
protects a casual letter or a snapshot as thoroughly as an elaborate novel or a carefully
and imaginatively done piece of scientific research. Because so little "labor" could support
a property claim, not surprisingly, a lot of it was also held by some to give rise to
intellectual property-even when the product did not qualify as a personal creation.
Under statutory copyright, for example, some circuits allowed the copyrighting of collected
data, not because it reflected some original thought process, but to reward the time and
effort that went into gathering it. For an extensive discussion of this precedent, see
National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 92 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (finding compilations of business data to be protected by copyright). Because others
either lacked alternative sources of access to the information (for example, only the
telephone company is likely to have a full list of the names, addresses, and telephone
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The fact that judges and scholars of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries used the labor rationale to sweep such a broad
swath of disparate interests into the category of matters entitled
to protection as private property, however, cannot be attributed
entirely to "loose" thinking on their part or to their lack of
concern with translating "enough and as good" into affirmative
limits. At least a part of the explanation resides in the content
that Locke and his intellectual heirs gave to the concept of
"property." Locke wrote that the term "property" included life
and liberty as well as land and goods.270 A body of law that
presupposes that the human being and the emanations of indi-
vidual personality are naturally subject to exclusive rights was
probably preordained to feel not merely comfort but also justi-
fication in its expansionary course.2 '1
Unsurprisingly, property law, developing in comparative iso-
lation from free speech theory and with sympathetic personality
claims to spur it on, extended itself as far as the judicial imagi-
nation led, even if portions of the public common were knowingly
or inadvertently fenced off in the process.
E. Uses and Abuses of the Incentive Theory
The second influential strain in defining intellectual property
law rights is the incentive theory,272 which received its early
elaboration largely in statutory rather than common law copy-
right cases. At the outset, statutory copyright in England and
the United States proceeded from a perspective on the property
numbers of its subscribers) or the will or resources to collect it anew, the holder of the
copyright enjoyed a monopoly on the production of certain kinds of works and, indirectly,
on their purely factual content. Just in the last Term, however, the Supreme Court
rejected this use of copyright law to protect mere labor. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1991). For an interesting defense of protecting what
she terms "low authorship works," see Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:
Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLmI. L. REV. 1865, 1870 (1990).
Although the application of intellectual property principles to commodify factual infor-
mation based on effort alone was largely confined to such materials as directories and
maps, it has occasionally cropped up in cases involving more complex works such as
histories and other forms of nonfiction. See, e.g., Toksvig, 181 F.2d at 667 (holding use of
portions of translated letters not permissible because defendant took advantage of labor
of plaintiff in preparing the translations). But see Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th
Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the Seventh Circuit might narrow the Toksvig holding in
future cases). Feist may also render this body of precedent obsolete.
270. 2 LOCKE, supra note 70, SS 123, 173.
271. For a discussion of Locke's treatment of personhood as a form of property, see
Levy, supra note 62, at 174-75.
272. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECoNomIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 39-41 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing incentive theory).
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rights of authors that was quite different from that described in
the previous section of this Article. Although the basis of the
individual's claim to control over her unpublished writings might
have been moral in nature, her rights to the work after publi-
cation were defined by what would provide the greatest benefit
to the public at large.
The limited monopoly granted to authors by this legislation
was justified by the need to maximize the production of new
works for public consumption, and its scope was measured by
that justification.273 For this reason, property under the copyright
laws, unlike the rules ordinarily pertaining to other forms of real
and personal property, was strictly limited in time and coverage
and, particularly in the United States, was conditioned on com-
pliance with certain formalities2 74 Under this public benefit ra-
tionale, any expansion of the copyright monopoly was defensible
only if it served the public's needs and not because it satisfied
the moral claims of the author.275
The reality turned out to be more complex. Although incentive
theory started out as a basis for strictly limiting the assignment
of property rights, in the end, it became a vehicle to justify their
proliferation and expansion.276 The reasons for this evolution are
complex. For one thing, measuring the level of authors' rights
necessary to maximize the public's supply of information and
speech is empirically difficult. 7 Contemporary commentators have
disagreed over whether existing protections exceed what is nec-
essary to maximize production,278 or whether they get it about
right.27 9
Additionally, from an early date, the content of incentive theory
was substantially infused, despite the ostensible public benefit
273. This point is discussed more fully in Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law
of Copyright: L 45 CoLuM. L. REv. 503, 506-11 (1945).
274. For example, copyright could not be obtained in the United States prior to 1977
if a work was published without a proper notice on the work of the existence of the
copyright. See 17 U.S.C.A. S 401 note (West 1977) (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary).
275. One of the best-known expositions of the needs-based view of copyright may be
found in Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
276. Id. at 324 (critiquing incentive theory).
277. Id. at 322.
278. See, e.g., id. at 313 (arguing that removal of copyright law would increase produc-
tion); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Ap-
proach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 293 (1989) (attacking copyright laws as unnecessary from
an economic perspective).
279. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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rationale of copyright, by attitudes and assumptions that owed
more to Lockeian thinking about authors' rights than to instru-
mental goals.210 As a consequence, the results achieved under the
rubric of pursuing the public good have tended to run in the
same direction as those derived from an application of the labor
principle:2z expansion of the realm of property and the diminution
of free use.212
A brief look at the history of statutory copyright illustrates
how incentive theory contributed to the property/free speech
problem. In the beginning, formal copyright provided, for a com-
paratively brief time, one simple protection: during the term of
the copyright, other people could not (unless they successfully
bargained for the right with the copyright owner) circulate copies
of the work for their own profit.2 3 Infringement was the piracy
of more or less the entire work, using its author's exact expres-
sion.m A would-be user who was willing to be more ambitious
or creative than a mere copyist could, however, engage in exten-
sive borrowing from the copyrighted work without being found
to have infringed a copyright.8 The early courts held such
transformations of the original author's expression as
translations 2 6 and abridgmentsm to be "new" works owing no
legal debt under copyright to the original.
280. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property. Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal
a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. L. REV. 365, 366 (1989).
281. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the labor principle).
282. When statutory copyright is at issue, of course, the property right is provided
for by the Constitution, just as the Constitution guarantees free speech. That both are
constitutionally based does not mean, however, that conflicts between them evaporate or
can be resolved at will in favor of one or the other. The addition of the First Amendment
to the original body of the Constitution placed some limits on the possible property
interests that could be recognized in the name of copyright. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER,
NIMUER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH S 2.05[c], at 2-57 (1984 & Supp. 1989) (arguing that
copyright is limited by First Amendment).
283. The sole exclusive rights provided to the owner of a copyright by the first
copyright statute in the United States were the rights to print, reprint, publish, and sell
the work. Act of May 31, 1790, S 1, 1 Stat. 124, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1783-1906, at 32 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 1906).
284. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
285. See infra notes 286-87.
286. A well-known decision on this point in the United States was Stowe v. Thomas,
23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514), holding that an unauthorized translation
of HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE ToM's CABIN (1853), did not violate Ms. Stowe's
copyright.
287. See, e.g., Story v. Holcomb, 23 F. Cas. 171, 175 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497)
(finding abridgment of Justice Story's Equity Jurisprudence almost entirely noninfringing);
Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271 (Ch. 1761) (finding no cause of action when
abstract of Samuel Johnson's The Prince of Abyssinia, a Tale appeared in London
magazine).
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Even this narrow approach to the scope of copyright infringe-
ment was explicable only in part on public benefit grounds
(although a common explanation for the rule was that it maxi-
mized the number of new works available to the public). The
approach also seemed to reflect an interpretation by these judges
of the commands of Lockeian rights-based thinking and a willing-
ness to graft them onto a statutory scheme grounded in wealth
maximization. These judges reasoned that, although the original
author concededly had made an investment of creative energy in
the first work and was "entitled" under natural law principles
to reap the benefits of that work, the adapter who translated or
abridged the earlier work was similarly entitled to the full benefit
of his efforts; he was not merely one who reaped what another
had sown, but the generator of an entirely new crop.3
This limited definition of "copying" persisted into the nine-
teenth century, but began to give way as judges, commentators,
and ultimately legislators (one assumes this view was always
held by the authors in question289) began to question whether
this rigorously narrow definition of copying was entirely fair to
the first author.2 ° The argument was often couched in terms
congenial to the public benefit theme of copyright. Specifically,
the hypothesis was that the anger and discouragement caused to
the original author by a denial of any profits generated by a
substantial use of his work could dampen his willingness to
benefit the public with new writings.2 1
The reasons that authors produce new works, of course, are
clearly not all economic. Creative writers and scholars may be
driven by internal needs to express their ideas or by the hope
of fame or esteem in their fields. Furthermore, the actual effect
288. Support for this analysis resides in the treatment of infringement claims involving
such factual works as maps and charts. These works necessarily mined the same vein
that previous authors had tapped, but a user could not survive an infringement claim
unless he could demonstrate that his work was the result of independent labor. See, e.g.,
Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 545 (1st Cir. 1905) (finding
use of information contained in prior work to infringe copyright); List Publishing Co. v.
Keller, 308 F. 772, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) (same); Longman v. Winchester, 33 Eng. Rep. 987,
988 (Ch. 1809) (same). For a discussion of the subsequent fate of this "sweat of the brow"
approach to copyright, see supra note 269.
289. See Chafee, supra note 273, at 511 & n.17 (citing BOSWELL'S JOURNAL OF A TOUR
TO THE HEBRIDES WITH SAMUEL JOHNSON 49 (Frederick A. Pottle & William D. Bennett
eds., 1773)) (discussing Johnson's disagreement with the view that abridgments and
translations were not violations of an author's copyright).-
290. See infra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing a creator's rights).
291. For a contemporary discussion of the incentive theory, see Samuelson, supra note
280, at 371.
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on the level of production that results from the presence or
absence of any particular protection, as has already been noted,
is highly speculative.2 2 Judging whether a regime that did not
allow authors to control the adaptation of their expression into
other forms better serves the public, therefore, is difficult. Clearly,
however, the arguments on behalf of enlarging the entitlement
in the original author ultimately succeeded because, in time, the
expansion appealed more strongly to the judicial and legislative
senses of "fairness" than did the earlier, more restrictive ap-
proach.
The incorporation of this idea of fairness to the first author
into the public benefit rationale primed the inducement theory
to become a justification for the allocation of property rights that
protected not only against direct, but also against indirect, uses
of expression. This trend was reflected in successive amendments
of the copyright laws, in the way the judiciary interpreted copy-
right statutes, and ultimately in the way courts elaborated ad-
ditional common law rights as well.23 Incentive theory became
largely identified with the existence of actual or potential eco-
nomic value and the channeling of that value to an "originator."' 4
During the nineteenth century, the protection of profits theory
led courts and legislatures to extend statutory copyright to
prohibit a wide range of imitations and transformations,2 5 and
292. See Palmer, supra note 278, at 289.
293. See PATTERSON, supra note 78, at 213-21 (discussing increasing emphasis on pro-
tecting and rewarding creator of a work).
294. The possibility that an author has been deprived of present or future profits is
clearly one of the most important elements in reviewing claims arising under federal
copyright law. For example, Justice Story, whose decision in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 13,497). was the origin of the fair use defense in American
copyright, said that the effect on the economic interests of the original author should be
a key factor in deciding whether a use of his work was infringing. Id. at 348. Another
instance of the importance of remuneration can be found in the opinion of Justice McLean
in Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497). Although declining
to depart from precedent holding abridgments to be noninfringing, he criticized it on the
ground that abridgments clearly do reduce the sales, and hence the profitability, of the
original. Id. at 173. This, said McLean, to a greater or lesser extent impairs the economic
worth of the copyright. Id. Arguing that unauthorized public performances of a copy-
righted dramatic work should constitute an infringement, one influential nineteenth
century commentator noted succinctly:
An author is entitled to all the fruits of his genius or his industry, to his
share of all the profits arising from any public use whatever of his production.
Protection adequate to secure these results should be expressly provided by
the legislature, and not left to the conflicting opinions of the courts.
DRONE, supra note 127, at 463.
295. See KAPLAN, supra note 142, at 20-32; Ginsburg, supra note 269, at 1885-88.
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not merely to prevent verbatim republications. The extension of
the copyright interest to control these so-called derivative works
meant that works tracking the original could be held to infringe
it even if they employed different words or images.2 6 Ultimately,
for example, an author or her successor gained the right to
license performances of her works as well as their translations
into foreign tongues and into different media such as plays or
moving pictures.P7 At the same time, the period of protection
was stretched so that today, this broad control under the copy-
right extends fifty years beyond the death of the author.28
Much about these developments, at least in the context of
statutory copyright, seems intuitively positive on policy grounds
and unobjectionable to a First Amendment scholar. In other
regards, however, important free speech costs resulted from
springing the property claim free from the confines of simple
copying. When a novelist says that a film is derivative of her
work, a court cannot dispose of the infringement action by merely
allowing the film maker to show that he used different words,2 9
a different medium, and even considerable variation on the al-
leged original's incident and character. °0  A potential author thus
cannot readily tell in advance if, by drawing on a preceding work,
he is making a legitimate use of an idea or infringing a copyright.
296. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (involving moving picture rights
to a short story).
297. 17 U.S.C.A. S 106(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991) gives the owner of the copyright
exclusive rights over the preparation of derivative works. The statute defines such rights
broadly to cover anything "based upon one or more preexisting works." Id. S 101. The
history of the transformation of copyright from a narrow to a comprehensive interest is
outlined in KAPLAN, supra note 142, at 1-78. One factor that contributed to the push
toward increased control over derivative works was the proliferation of new communi-
cations technologies and the new opportunities they created for exploiting the inherent
value of a copyrighted work. Kaplan points out that intellectual values were in a state
of transition from an admiration for imitation that marked the neoclassical period to the
preference for originality that marked the Romantics. Id. at 22. This change, he believes,
played an important role in expanding the sweep of copyright. See id. at 22-25.
298. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). For works made for hire and for anonymous and
pseudonymous works, however, the statute provides for 75 years of copyright protection
running from the year of first publication or a term of 100 years running from the year
of its creation, whichever expires first. Id. § 302(c).
299. The Salinger case, which turned on the issue of whether a second author's choice
of words was too "close" to the original, is an example of a situation in which saying it
differently is not enough. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
300. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.) (illustrating
the complications that inhere in determining whether a second work is derivative of the
first), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); Burgess v. Chase-Riboud, 765 F. Supp. 233 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (same).
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Faced with the fuzzed line between idea and expression, 1
would-be speakers, unsure of their rights, might conclude that
they are better off bargaining with the copyright owner for
permission than risking the costs of litigation, a possible injunc-
tion, and an assessment of damages. Once the would-be speaker
asks the first author, the first author may, of course, deny the
license for any or even for no reason, thereby giving her a degree
of control that can extend beyond the technical confines of her
actual rights under the statute. Furthermore, once the question
is before a judge, the judge will, as the Salinger case demon-
strated30 2 enjoy considerable discretion about where to draw the
line in a particular instance between what can be property-
expression-and what cannot-the idea.03 Although this uncer-
tainty may be a tolerable burden as a matter of copyright policy,
it is less tolerable when considered from the vantage of free
speech, because the uncertainty can cast a serious chill on com-
municative activities. Additionally, the leeway left to courts in
deciding what is property allows judges to import into the deci-
sion on the merits their own judgments about the worthiness or
lack of worth of the defendant's expression.0 4 The very long
duration of copyrights under the current law30 5 and the conse-
quent lessening of the leeway provided by the concept of public
domain status exacerbate the problem.
Additionally, current arguments could further enlarge the grasp
of the incentive theory and, by extension, the gray area within
which property rights war with speech rights. Although property
protections under copyright are awarded today in a way that
usually allows the owner to reserve her opportunity to share in
301. Sheldon is a good example of just how fuzzy the line can be. In that case, much
of the similarity in story line between the infringed and the infringing works was a result
of their common factual base-an actual murder case in Scotland in the middle of the
19th century. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 49. Because these facts were not copyrightable, the
only possible area of infringement lay in the fact that both works used several similar
dramatic devices. Id. at 56. These devices were not unique to the infringed work, however,
but formed the material common to many other melodramatic novels and films, most of
which were part of the public domain. Id. at 54. Judge Hand, in a controversial opinion,
nevertheless decided that the similarities in the two works resulted from a taking of
expression rather than idea and that the defendant, by proceeding without a license from
the playwright, had plagiarized. Id. For criticism of the Hand decision, see KAPLAN, supra
note 142, at 48-52.
302. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 93.
303. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing the idea/expression
dichotomy).
304. See supra note 24 (discussing courts' considerations of content); infra note 319
(same).
305. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing statutory duration).
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the present and future profits attributable to her work,08 in-
fringement claims are least powerful in cases in which the owner
cannot demonstrate with reasonable certainty that an uncon-
sented use actually threatens such profits.30 7 As a result, advo-
cates of strong copyright protection are pressing Congress and
the courts to interpret or change the law in a way that either
presumes the existence of loss from the fact of use or abandons
altogether the concept of harm.30° Such a development, of course,
would complete the merger of moral and public benefit theories.309
Although American copyright has not yet embraced this ap-
proach,310 courts are able to achieve almost the same results by
306. Loss of profits, of course, does not command a finding of infringement. Commercial
use is just one factor in deciding whether a use is immunized under the fair use doctrine.
See 17 U.S.C. S 107 (1988).
307. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 432-34, 456 (1984)
(treating use of video recorder to time-shift viewing of television programs as a fair use
because plaintiffs failed to bear the burden of proving that economic harm was likely);
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Cl. Ct. 1973) (refusing to
find that library photocopying for the personal use of individuals constituted an infringe-
ment absent clear proof of economic injury), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975).
308. David Ladd, a former United States Register of Copyrights, has argued that
copyright law should protect against all unauthorized uses of an author's work, and not
merely those that deprive the copyright owner of some demonstrable element of value.
David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. OF COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
421, 428 (1983).
309. To Ladd, such unqualified protection is appropriate because copyright law serves
not merely an economic interest, but a liberty one in that it supports "a vibrant,
heterogeneous, and dissonant community of publishers." Id. The Ladd position owes more
to moral rights in the Lockeian sense than to incentive theory grounded largely in
economic and utilitarian values. This is evident from a passage that the article quoted
approvingly:
"The inventor of a book or other contrivance of thought holds his property,
as a god holds it, by right of creation. . . .Whatever tends to lower the
protection given to intellectual property is so much taken from the forces
which have been active in securing the advances of society during the last
centuries."
Id. at 426 (quoting Hearings Before the House Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 735
(1936) (statement of Nathanial Shaler)). For a cogent critique of Ladd's and similar
arguments, see Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Prin-
cipled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 589-91 (1985).
310. American law contrasts sharply with French intellectual property law in this
respect. For a discussion of the role of personal, as opposed to economic, rights in French
law and the suggestion that protection of such rights be strengthened through legislation
in the United States, see Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law
Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988). The recent
adherence by the United States to the Berne Convention, which mandates some form of
recognition of moral rights, has brought the issue before Congress. See Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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applying a more rather than less generous standard in determin-
ing whether economic harm has occurred or is likely to occur in
the future.311 Under such a standard, even indirect or partial uses
of copyrighted expression that for any reason offend a judge's
sense of fair play can easily be translated into sufficient "eco-
nomic harm" to support a finding of a copyright violation. Thus
a case like Sacinqer, involving at most indirect copying and highly
speculative economic impact, 12 can nonetheless be found to con-
stitute infringement under the existing form of incentive-based
reasoning.
Incentive theory as developed in statutory copyright has also
been adopted by the courts for application in common law claims
seeking property protection for a variety of kinds of information,
including performance skills, personality, and appearance. 13 The
reasons for this importation are essentially those familiar in the
copyright setting-the encouragement of publicly beneficial ac-
tivity and the fairness of allocating value to its creator. 14
Because the types of informational mitter that the common
law could classify as property were considerably broader than
those that were entitled to statutory copyright, these cases
presented more frequent, more troubling, and more obvious ques-
tions about what should be owned and what should be free.
Subsequent sections will further explore these complications.31 5
One could, of course, argue that this Article has just described
a misconceived interpretation of incentive theory-although not,
I think, a misdescription of it.316 Economists, for example, would
311. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir.) (finding infringement
in face of quite speculative and minor economic injury), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987);
Meerpol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding infringement on weak
evidence of economic harm), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). A showing of economic
harm, however strong or weak, is a condition precedent to a finding of infringement, as
Sony makes clear. Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
312. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 283-98 (discussing the history of the incentive theory). Warren
and Brandeis seem to have recognized that potential because, in the course of their
discussion of the Lockeian justification for protecting the conduct of one's life, they add
that the protection of "the conscious products of labor" may in part be given "as an
encouragement to effort." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 207.
314. Landes & Posner, supra note 279, at 279 (stating that "striking the correct balance
between access and incentive is the central problem of copyright law").
315. See infra notes 328-35 and accompanying text.
316. Other scholars seem in agreement that what this Article denominates as the
incentive theory of copyright is an amalgam of natural rights and neoclassical economics.
See Wendy J. Gordon, An Ivquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis-
tency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. Rnv. 1343, 1446-60 (1989).
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urge that efficiency be the criterion for testing the rules that
apply to intellectual property. 17 But even if rights were assigned
only when efficient (an approach to intellectual property which
cannot be discussed in the context of this Article), neoclassic
economic theory would nevertheless be a poor source to consult
about the question of whether the property interests at issue go
too far from a First Amendment perspective.3 18 The answers,
whatever they may be, turn on criteria other than efficiency and
wealth maximization.
II. NATURAL LAW'S CHILDREN: SPEECH AS PROPERTY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
By the end of the nineteenth century, well-entrenched ration-
ales were in place that provided clear support both for the
proliferation of novel property rights in speech and for the
expansive use of traditional property concepts as a hook to
regulate speech for a host of noneconomic reasons.319 The First
Amendment was a force to be considered, but its outlines and
requirements remained vague. Certainly, very little formal doc-
trine existed on its role in shaping the content of the speech
common. Furthermore, judges were inclined both by their general
familiarity with the precepts of intellectual property law and by
their comfort with Lockeian attitudes about individualism and
autonomy to sympathize with claims that people deserved "own-
ership" of their creations. 20
317. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 275, at 289 (arguing that intellectual property rules
should promote efficiency); Landes & Posner, supra note 279, at 325 (same); Palmer, supra
note 278, at 300-04 (same).
318. Free speech values and the fair use doctrine could be suborned by strict application
of economic efficiency analysis. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (noting
importance Supreme Court places on maintaining a vast common of information for First
Amendment purposes).
319. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987), is but one example. Copyright has also been used to penalize speakers for their
choice of content. An illustration of this may be found in MCA v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180
(2d Cir. 1981). In that case, a finding of copying rested on very slim evidence of substantial
similarity. Id. at 187. By treating the second work as infringing, the court was then in a
position to deny the defense of fair use. Id. at 189. The apparent reason for the result
was that the "use" was in a song with "dirty" lyrics in a play that was itself an erotic
and satirical work. Id. at 185. In his dissent, Judge Mansfield commented that the
majority was using copyright to allow it to "act as a board of censors." Id. at 191
(Mansfield, J., dissenting); see also supra note 24 (discussing effect of court sympathy
toward content of speech).
320. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing rights to fruits of labor).
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As discussed previously, the law had already started to rec-
ognize an expansive range of things that counted as "creations"
for purposes of property, incorporating within them at least
indirectly the human personality and the noncopyrightable prod-
ucts of the individual's mental and moral exertions. 321 The form
in which an intellectual product had to be embodied to gain
protection had begun to lose importance, and the concept of what
constituted an infringement of such a product had stretched well
beyond the simple act of copying.
The most direct result of this property-oriented mindset was
the judiciary's readiness to translate into positive law Warren
and Brandeis's advocacy of a right of privacy. 32 Warren and
Brandeis argued that each person should be given the right to
recover in a court of law for the publication of accurate infor-
mation about themselves, simply for the reason that such public-
ity was unwanted.32
Their enthusiasm for this idea did not blind Warren and Bran-
deis to the possibility that a pure form of this invocation of
property theory would significantly deplete the stores of infor-
mation available for the free use of the public. In this regard,
they demonstrated a sensitivity not so commonly found in prior
invocations of property theory. Their approach was to deal with
the problem indirectly, by limiting the privacy right to instances
of widespread publicity,3? and directly, by means of a limited
privilege.
The privilege would excuse unconsented publication of infor-
mation if free access served some significant public need.38 Warren
and Brandeis limited this essential information to that which
321. See supra notes 196-261 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
323. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 197. The modernized version of the tort
originally advocated by Warren and Brandeis is that set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, S 652D (1977).
324. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 213-14. As a result, the so-called private
facts branch of the privacy tort has been largely confined to cases in which the publication
occurred in the media. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyw ht: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 300-01, 337-41 (1983).
Another subset of cases involve debt collectors who harass their quarry too publicly. See
Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1962); Brents v.
Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ky. 1927).
325. The authors also incorporated the privileges that applied to libel and slander.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 216-17. The privileges were, in 1890, considerably
less sweeping than they are today, following the constitutionalization of defamation law.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-92 (1964).
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related to the public activities of public persons. Examples in-
cluded matter pertaining to a candidate's fitness for public office
or activities undertaken by someone "in a public or a quasi public
capacity. '3 26 From the outset, however, courts sensed that they
should apply the privilege more broadly, lest this quasi-property
right seriously diminish the available material for public dis-
course.32 As a result, the so-called newsworthiness privilege as
it actually developed extended well beyond discussions of'public
persons in their public capacities to encompass all matters in
which the public had a "legitimate" interest.328
The attempt to keep alive the private facts action while si-
multaneously privileging newsworthy reports required a remark-
able amount of judicial backing and filling. The idea that we own
ourselves was simply too hard for the law to digest whole, at
least in this context. As a result, the tort envisioned by Warren
and Brandeis limped into the 1990's, encumbered by powerful
restrictions and as a mere shadow of its intended glory. For an
invasion of privacy by publication of private facts to be actionable
today the revelation must be without consent and be so highly
offensive that it would shock and dismay any reasonable person.329
Only a rare revelation reaches that level, and if it does, it must
still squeeze by the mammoth gatekeeper that the newsworthi-
ness privilege has become. This means quite simply that when a
contemporary plaintiff's preference for obscurity bumps up against
a defendant's claimed right to communicate truthfully to the
public, almost inevitably-if reluctantly-courts come down on
the side of the defendant.30
326. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 215-16.
327. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), the New York
Court of Appeals expressed concern on First Amendment grounds about adopting law
that suppressed accurate speech and gave that as one reason for rejecting the privacy
right. Id. at 447-48. Although the Georgia Supreme Court reached the opposite result
two years later in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1904), that
court was obviously also troubled by the implications for First Amendment freedoms of
limiting accurate speech, and several pages of the opinion were devoted to a discussion
of the problem. See id. at 81-83.
328. See Zimmerman, supra note 324, at 350-62.
329. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539-40 (1989) (citing the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977)).
330. Florida Star is the most important recent case denying recovery for the publication
of private information. See id. at 526 (holding that imposing damages on a newspaper for
publishing the name of a rape victim, when the information was legally obtained, violated
the First Amendment). When the author surveyed the first 90 years of case law in this
area, she found fewer than 18 cases in which plaintiffs were either awarded damages or
found to have stated a cause of action sufficient to warrant trial. Zimmerman, supra note
324, at 293 n.5.
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What the law could not swallow whole, however, it tried to
ingest piecemeal. Reluctant to abandon the field entirely, courts
looked around for a "plus," a distinguishing feature that would
allow them to evade the newsworthiness bar. They found it by
referring back to principles of just deserts blended with promo-
tion of creation as developed in statutory and common law copy-
right.331 The hook was a finding of "commercial use." 3 2 By this,
the courts seemed to mean that a particular communication had
appropriated to itself some value that derived from the identity
or other attributes of the plaintiff-that is, it was a form of
unjust enrichment.
Inherent in the "commercial use" distinction were two assump-
tions, neither one of which holds up well on examination. The
first is that regulation in this area serves an objective other than
the control of speech. The second is that speech that "steals
value" is not the kind of speech that the First Amendment was
designed to protect.
The first assumption has a certain superficial appeal in that a
large portion of successful cases were ones in which a person's
name, face, or other identifying characteristics had been used
without permission in an advertisement or in some other com-
mercial setting, a use that customarily was the result of a
bargained-for exchange.m
The underlying complaint in a large number of these cases,
however, did not on examination relate so clearly to the loss of
expected payment. Many of the plaintiffs were objecting to the
fact that their names or faces had been publicized at all and not
because they had been deprived of control over an economically
valuable commodity. 83 They did not, and probably could not, say
that they were protecting a present or a future interest in
exploiting that which had been appropriated. As a result, al-
though profits were the trigger of the so-called appropriations
tort, the desire to suppress was often its engine.3 5
331. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (holding
that use of plaintiff's identity for commercial purposes is tortious).
333. Celebrities and models, for example, are typically paid for agreeing to pose for
or act in advertisements.
334. See infra notes 336-39, 344 and accompanying text.
335. Prosser concluded that appropriation protected "not so much a mental as a
proprietary" interest. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 406 (1960). This
has been disputed by some, most notably by Edward Bloustein who characterized the
harm as a personal affront resulting from the "commercial exploitation of ... [an
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One of the earliest successful appropriations cases, Pavesich v.
New England Life Insurance Co.,336 serves as an excellent exam-
ple. In Pavesich, the basis for the complaint was unwanted pub-
licity, but the court assuaged its concerns about possible free
speech implications by justifying the result on the ground that
the use of the plaintiffs persona was commercialA Similarly,
when New York passed a statute in 1903 to protect privacy, the
tort action was, and continues to be, limited to uses of a plaintiff's
identity for purposes of trade or business.= The courts, however,
interpreted the statute as permitting recovery for numerous uses
that the plaintiff found offensive and would not have agreed to
even if the user had offered him generous payment.P
Although the appropriation cases were designed primarily to
allocate value, their identification with the law of privacy had
certain practical disadvantages. Warren and Brandeis successfully
argued that invasions of privacy were an affront to personhood
and, for remedial purposes, should be treated as a personal rather
than as a property injury.3 40 They were. Rights against appro-
priation, therefore, were personal to the plaintiff and could not
be transferred either during life or upon death.
In the 1950's, the opportunity arose to remedy some or all of
those defects. Relying on the intellectual property theories that
have been discussed, the courts invented yet another form of
protection, the right to publicity341 One purpose of the new right
was to allow the law to distinguish between situations in which
individual's] personality." Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 988-90 (1974). For the most part,
however, the poor fit of appropriation into the law of privacy has been acknowledged.
See Post, supra note 250, at 667-74. A second branch of the privacy tort, involving the
so-called "false light" cases, also originated from a finding of harm to the plaintiffs
proprietary interests. After 1960, when Dean Prosser identified this separate class of
privacy case as centered on the publication of inaccurate information, Prosser, supra, at
400-01, 406, these cases lost their association with appropriation, but they had originated
as torts sounding in wrongful commercial use. See generally Diane L. Zimmerman, False
Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 375-83 (1989)
(detailing the history of the tort of false light).
336. 50 S.E. 68.
337. Id. at 79-80.
338. See Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §S 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified at N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW S§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988)).
339. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380-82 (1967) (allowing suit over use in a
popular play of plaintiff's experience as a hostage); Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 103 N.E. 1108,
1109-10 (N.Y. 1913) (discussing use of plaintiff's identity in a newsreel depicting a
shipwreck). In both of these cases, the plaintiffs wanted their lives to remain private;
payment was clearly irrelevant.
340. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
341. See infra note 342.
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privacy was at issue and those involving claims of some clearer
form of unjust enrichment. 2 Publicity was supposed to involve
purely economic claims. 3
In practice, however, the subject matter of publicity and that
of appropriations cases are often indistinguishable. The right
seems as readily available to those who hope to squelch any use
of personal information about themselves by the defendant as it
is to those who merely want their proper share of the profits
from the use.3 4
The main benefit of the publicity right to plaintiffs, and one
of its chief problems under the First Amendment, is that, in
increasing numbers of jurisdictions, the heirs and assigns of a
well-known person are now also able to exercise control over the
name, appearance, and other traits of that well-known person,
thereby extending the possibility of control well beyond the
lifetime of the individual. 65 As a result, it would be naive to
claim that the common law rights against appropriation or the
infringement of publicity interests do not impinge on speech
rights but merely allocate profits.
The second assumption-that speech that steals value differs
from speech that is the subject of the First Amendment-is
patently simplistic and by far the most disturbing fall-out of the
modern cases. Historically, the reliance on the commercial use
distinction in this regard had some merit in relation to First
Amendment doctrine. Prior to the 1976 Supreme Court decision
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
342. The first case recognizing a right of publicity as distinct from the privacy-
appropriation line of decisions was Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). For a discussion of the
relationship between the right of publicity and the privacy-based right against commercial
appropriations, see Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation
of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986).
343. See Halpern, supra note 342 passim
344. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345-48 (Ct. App. 1983)
(finding that actor Clint Eastwood had stated a claim for violation of his right of publicity
by the National Enquirer for reasons that seemed to have far less to do with his desire
to profit from the use than from his wish to keep his name out of the publication
altogether); see also Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 698-99 (Ga. 1982) (acknowledging frankly that the
right of publicity may be used to protect the status and memory of Dr. King).
345. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE S 990 (West Supp. 1991) (providing that publicity rights
are descendible and survive for 50 years after the personality's death); Martin Luther
King, 296 S.E.2d at 705 (holding the estate of Dr. King has a right to sue for violation
of King's right of publicity by the manufacturer of plastic busts of the civil rights leader).
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sumer Council, Inc., 4 courts believed that commercial speech fell
entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment. 3 7 Al-
though the Supreme Court has never fully defined commercial
speech, the term clearly encompasses advertising that merely
proposes commercial transactions such as the sales of goods or
services.m Courts in the early part of the century that imposed
restrictions on advertising, therefore, had reason to be confident
that they did not tread on speech rights.
Since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, advertisements have
also fallen within the scope of constitutional protection, although
the level of that protection has waxed and waned considerably
over the ensuing fifteen years. r9 Thus it can no longer be said
with certainty today that even the advertising cases present no
possible First Amendment problems.35° Because these cases con-
tinue to stand in a different relationship to the First Amendment
than nonadvertising cases, however, consideration of their status
would require separate discussion that is beyond the scope of
this overview.351 Suffice it to say that the most acute First
346. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
347. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
348. The Supreme Court explicitly held that the First Amendment did not cover
commercial speech in Valentine. Id. at 54-55. Subsequently, the Court alluded to the sharp
distinction between "commercial" speech and protected speech as a reason for the
permissibility of the appropriation tort. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9 (1967).
349. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975),
the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect "commercial speech." See
Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54-55. In 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
770-73, the Supreme Court suggested that regulation of accurate commercial speech
involving a lawful product or activity was unconstitutional. By 1980, the court had
backtracked; its decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), imposed a four-point test that did not bar regulation of
truthful commercial speech entirely, although it did seem to set a very high standard-
a showing of substantial need and lack of more limited alternatives-for allowing such
regulation. Since Central Hudson, however, the Court has allowed a total ban on truthful
commercial speech in two separate cases and has indicated that the state can satisfy the
Constitution with a modest showing of "substantial" need and without proving it is using
the least restrictive means. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475-78 (1989);
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 341-47 (1986).
350. One form of advertising that remains beyond the protection of the speech clause
is misleading advertising. See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
This might provide a ground for finding appropriations in advertising to be actionable.
The use of a person's identity in a way that falsely suggests his endorsement of a service,
a company, or a product could, for example, constitute a deception of the consumer. This
formulation, however, would depart quite radically from the historical justifications for
the appropriations tort. See supra notes 331-39 and accompanying text.
351. The application of the commercial speech distinction is complicated. Although one
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Amendment problems are presented by those "commercial" uses
that arise outside of advertisements.
From a very early date, courts demonstrated that the prohi-
bitions against appropriations could incorporate more than ad-
vertising.3 2 After stating that uses for purposes of trade or
business were not newsworthy, the courts then proceeded to
define trade or business use very broadly to include works that,
in the courts' view, were "entertainment" rather than news or
were works the courts deemed to have "fictidnalized" some aspect
of the plaintiff's life.30 As a result, virtually the only form of
communication that was essentially immune from appropriation
claims seemed to be accurate news reports.
Obviously, then, the commercial use distinction has very little
informative value in distinguishing limits on access to information
that impermissibly inhibit free exchange on matters of public
concern from those that inhibit the exchange so marginally that
property rules do not offend the requirements of the Constitution.
A 1918 decision of the United States Supreme Court, Inter-
national News Service v. The Associated Press,35 best exemplifies
might think that advertising uses would be more disfavored, in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the majority opinion noted that the case
for protecting work for which one ordinarily is paid is stronger than that for protecting
against the mere use of one's photo in an advertisement. Id. at 576.
352. See, e.g., Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. 1913) (involving a newsreel).
353. The early cases that found nonadvertising uses of the plaintiffs identity to be for
trade or business commonly relied on the entertainment rationale. See, e.g., id. at 1110-
11 (holding that a reenactment of a boat collision inserted into a newsreel was actionable
because it was entertainment, not news); Sutton v. Hearst, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234-35 (App.
Div. 1950) (explaining that the use at issue was designed "to amuse and astonish the
reading public, not for the legitimate purpose of disseminating news"). This mode of
analysis began to generate concern as more sophisticated application of First Amendment
doctrine evolved because of the fear that permitting recovery for an appropriation by an
"entertainment" could result in penalizing accurate information. As a result modern cases
tend to rely on the fictionalization rationale. This modern trend has allowed plaintiffs in
jurisdictions like New York to continue to sue over their portrayals in factual and
imaginary works, but now on the ground that their lives have been "fictionalized" in
some way. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1967) (involving fictionalization in
a play); Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. 1966) (involving fiction-
alization in a biography for children), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 239, and reaffd on
remand, 233 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1967). For an extensive discussion of the fictionalization
rationale, see Zimmerman, supra note 335, at 440-47. For an example of a different sort
of appropriation rationale in a nonadvertising case, see Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76
(deciding case involving liability for videotaping an entire performance and showing it on
a newscast as one arising under right of publicity, related to, but not identical with,
appropriation).
354. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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the shortcomings of the distinction. This case is particularly
noteworthy because its analysis extended well beyond the self-
imposed limits of the privacy-appropriation cases by recognizing
a private property right to control the dissemination of accurate
news 55 The majority used the commercial use distinction as an
explanation for the conclusion that a wire service engaged in an
unfair trade practice when it utilized information from another
wire service's news reports but that the general public, when it
used the same information, did not.35 6
The Court upheld an injunction against International News
Service (INS) prohibiting it from further use of news bulletins
generated by Associated Press (AP).357 The source of AP's prop-
erty right to control such use was somewhat difficult for the
Court to identify, however. It was not willing to credit AP with
the ownership of the news simply because it had happened to
report its Furthermore, AP could not trace ownership rights
to the customary source of protection for published writings
because it did not hold a copyright.3 5 9 Even if a copyright had
existed, it might not have helped AP because INS probably would
not have been found to have taken AP's "expression" of the
355. See id. at 236. In this regard, International News Service is similar to Zacehini,
which also found a property interest superior to that in disseminating accurate news
reports, see Zacchini, 438 U.S. at 578.
356. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234-35. The law of unfair trade practices,
which also proceeds on a theory of unjust enrichment, has been applied with increasing
frequency to disputes over information. In particular, the federal unfair trade practice
statute, S 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a) (1988), has been an important
resource for individuals who want exclusive control over such "creations" as their public
images and appearances. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1989)
(discussing facts under which Ginger Rogers invoked Lanham Act against the film Fred
and Ginger); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (invoking
Lanham Act in case involving Woody Allen look-alike). Even traditional trademark law
has provided a "property" basis for limiting expressive activities, as the United States
Supreme Court decision in the Gay Olympics case demonstrates. See San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532-35 (1987). In one of
the more interesting attempts to use trademark law to control another's expressive work,
CBS sued over a new play that used the Amos and Andy characters. Silverman v. CBS,
870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989). The suit was ultimately unsuccessful, however, because the
court concluded that CBS had abandoned its trademark in the characters. Id. at 46.
Virtually all branches of intellectual property law, with the possible exception of patents,
thus are capable of engendering important First Amendment concerns. The need, however,
to confine this paper to a manageable size and scope precludes an individualized discussion
of each of these areas of the law.
357. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 245-46.
358. Id. at 234-35.
359. Id.
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news. INS seemed to have rewritten the accounts, using the
facts rather than AP's expressionA1°
Additionally, the Court could not reason by analogy to the
body of law that protected certain information such as trade
secrets,361 because news of world events is not the subject matter
of a trade secret and the content of the bulletins was in no sense
secret. INS obtained its information from AP's bulletins after
they were published or publicly posted.s62
Moreover, although the majority opinion downplayed the facts
of the case, INS could not have gathered the material at issue
itselfV. The information "appropriated" from AP related to the
progress of the First World War, information otherwise inacces-
sible to INS because it was unable to use the cable and telegraph
lines from certain countries in Europe. 4 Furthermore, newspa-
pers dependent on INS could have acquired this information
through no other means. Membership in AP was limited and
excluded about half the newspapers in the country.3 5 By allowing
members of AP to prevent use of the material in their reports
by a rival wire service, the Court in essence gave them a
monopoly on news of major national consequence.
Despite these circumstances, the Court found that INS had
wrongfully appropriated the results of AP's labor and that INS
could be enjoined from the practice in the future.3 66 The Court's
attempted distinction between use by INS and by the general
public, and its limitation of its holding to apply only to "fresh"
news,367 suggest the result may have been one with which the
majority was not entirely comfortable. These attempted distinc-
tions do not conceal the fact that the rule in the INS case
proscribed the use of information by the only sort of party that
could provide it to the large portion of the public not served by
AP member papers during the time when it was at its highest
value as hot news. The effect, despite disclaimers, was to rec-
ognize the propriety of a property interest in information "of
360. Id. at 234-37.
361. Id. For a definition of trade secrets, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets are a form of property for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution).
362. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 249 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 263.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 263-64.
366. Id. at 245-46.
367. Id.
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public concern under the rubric of "commercial use." Discomfited
or not, the Court adhered to the Lockeian concept that individuals
and entities ought to be rewarded with exclusive rights to the
economic returns generated by their own enterprise and effort,
without regard to the nature of the product.368
Taken at face value, this principle suggests that property rules
are appropriately applied whenever someone exploits for profit
information generated by the personality, activities, or intellec-
tual efforts of someone else-and that the First Amendment is
not offended by the requirement that the user first bargain for
that right with the source of the value.
Certainly, no evidence suggests that First Amendment juris-
prudence has ever accepted this view. In cases in which courts
have conceptualized the problem as an issue of free speech (which
was not the case in International News Service3 9), courts have
rejected attempts to limit the right to publish information on
matters of public concern in all but the most unusual circum-
stances 3 70 The history of the newsworthiness standard in the law
of privacy is but one example that proves this point 71
The text of the Constitution itself as well as case law affir-
matively contradicts the argument that profit-taking removes
publications from the protection of the newsworthiness privilege
or of the First Amendment. The press, which the First Amend-
ment expressly protects, is clearly as interested in garnering
368. Id. at 247; see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. It is interesting, and
perhaps a bit ironic, that Justice Brandeis, the progenitor of the privacy right, penned
the exceedingly cogent dissent in the International News Service case.
369. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
370. Other examples of the lengths to which the speech and press clauses immunize
publication from restrictive rules appear in the national security and libel cases. See, e.g.,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that the
goyernment can prevent publication of information in the interests of national security
only upon an extraordinary showing of need); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1963) (holding that publication of false information about a public official can
be penalized only upon clear and convincing proof of knowing falsity or reckless disregard
of truth). Limitations on the principle of free and unrestricted use exist, but they are
quite narrow: speakers may not violate statutory copyright, see Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985), they may not obtain news by illegal
means such as trespass or theft, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518
(1991), and enforceable limits on the right to publish information can be imposed by
express contract or by principles of promissory estoppel, see id. at 2519-20 (declaring
promise of confidentiality regarding identity of source can be enforced if state law so
provides); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-10 (1980) (holding violation of
government secrecy agreement by unauthorized publication of book actionable).
371. See supra notes 323-30 and accompanying text.
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profits from the information it publishes as any other merchant. 72
But to treat the press' commercial uses of information as potential
infringements of another's property rights would impose such
severe burdens on speech activities as to render the protection
available under the First Amendment almost nugatory. Under
such an onerous regime, one can only imagine what sportscasters,
entertainment reporters, science writers, and gossip columnists
would be able to tell us each day.
In short, applying the commercial use distinction to define
areas that do not implicate the First Amendment is essentially
circular. It allows the decisionmaker to reach the too-easy con-
clusion that, because information is commercially valuable, it is
ipso facto a form of wealth to which property rights are properly
assignable. As a result, property theory, as it has presently
developed, is the proverbial rudderless ship. 73 Armed with a
grab-bag of ill-defined justifications-allocation of profits, encour-
agement of socially beneficial activities, and the moral deserts of
the creator-courts entered the twentieth century and the era
of the First Amendment without a clear course between compet-
ing ideas or a way to chart one. Unsurprisingly, characterization
has become a substitute for analysis; novel property claims have
proliferated; and judges have sometimes found in the flexibility
offered by the term "property" a congenial opportunity to do
what the First Amendment forbids-censor, or at least harry,
speech they find offensive, unfair, or unworthy.37 4
372. This is not to say, however, that commercial use is never a criteria for deciding
if property protections are appropriate. One area in which the distinction between profit-
making and nonprofit uses has been applied is in copyright fair use cases, and ordinarily
fair use cases do not pose any conflict with the First Amendment. See supra note 126
and accompanying text (discussing fair use doctrine). In these cases, however, the issue
does not arise unless the court first concludes that the defendant has made more than
de minimis use of the plaintiff's actual expression. Expression is entitled to be treated
as a private property interest by virtue of the authority granted to Congress by the
Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. In this instance, therefore, the
conclusion that protectible property rights exist results from an exercise of legislative
power authorized by the Constitution, and not from the simple existence of value. In the
fair use context, the Supreme Court has said that copying for a commercial purpose is
presumptively (although not conclusively) unfair, whereas proof of economic injury must
affirmatively be established by the plaintiff if the use is noncommercial. Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
373. This point has been made within the context of intellectual property doctrine
itself by Pamela Samuelson, supra note 280, at 367. Samuelson does not address the
property/free speech line in her Article, reviewing instead the fit of recent Supreme
Court cases finding property rights in information into traditional intellectual property
law. Id. at 325-28. Interestingly, she concludes that within that context, too, the case law
is painting with far too broad a brush. Id. at 400.
374. See supra notes 24-50, 319 and accompanying text (describing cases in which
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One current example demonstrates the sorts of choices between
property and speech that, in this analytic state of confusion,
parties are invited to place before modern courts. Successors to
the estate of the late singer Janis Joplin recently sued for
damages and injunctive relief against the author and producers
of a play about Joplin. 375 In addition to a copyright claim relating
to music allegedly performed without a license, the plaintiffs
claimed invasion of the late singer's right to publicity. 6 The
complaint alleged that the defendants wrongfully appropriated
the "name, likeness, and image" of Ms. Joplin by, among other
things, using an actress who "imitate[s]" her performing and
singing style.37 Obviously, Ms. Joplin's life, appearance, and per-
forming style, by virtue of her talent, fame, and position as a
1960's icon, have potential market value. In fact, Joplin Enter-
prises actually assigned (presumably for money) the "exclusive"
rights to make films, television broadcasts, and theatrical prod-
uctions "based on the life and/or times" of the singer to a company
prior to the production of the defendants' play.w8 Just as clearly,
Ms. Joplin invested considerable energy and skill in creating that
value, giving her successors a moral claim to the fruits of her
efforts.
Are we in the presence of a violated property right or rather
of an appropriate exercise of freedom of speech? Under the
current state of the law, how can one confidently phrase an
answer? The information at issue-her life, how she looked and
sounded, and how she performed-is content that is, in this
author's opinion, clearly a part of the First Amendment common.
Under the theories that have been applied to assign property
rights, however, the information can also, and may ultimately be,
susceptible to characterization as a privately owned resource.P9
property law was arguably used to penalize or threaten speech because the plaintiff or
the court disapproved of its content).
375. Complaint, Joplin Enters. v. Allen, No. C91-1035 (W.D. Wash. filed July 24, 1991)
(copies of the complaint and answer on file with the William and Mary Law Review). The
plaintiff also sought recovery on grounds of unfair competition and unjust enrichment.
The district court recently granted summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of
violation of publicity rights, holding that under applicable state statutory and common
law, the material complained of was not actionable. Joplin Enters. v. Allen, No. C91-1035,
slip op. at 3-5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 1991).
376. Complaint at 11-12, Joplin Enters. v. Allen, No. C91-1035 (W.D. Wash. filed July
24, 1991).
377. Id. at 11.
378. Id. at 6.
379. The district court declined to reach the constitutional questions posed by the
Joplin case, although the opinion hinted that the court was sympathetic to the First
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III. CAN THE EGG BE UNSCRAMBLED? DEFINING THE SPHERES
OF SPEECH AND PROPERTY
Much that is paradoxical about the treatment of speech under
the First Amendment versus its treatment under the rubric of
property law results from bad timing; the First Amendment
doctrine was a late bloomer and never succeeded entirely in
catching up with already entrenched ways of thinking about
intellectual property. The remainder of the problem, of course,
is the breadth and undisciplined nature of the intellectual prop-
erty theory itself.
The question remains, however, what at this late date can be
done to rationalize an area that is clearly an untenable mess.
Because any answer to that question cannot, realistically, be
written on a clean slate, one approach is to ask whether the
existing precedent can be read in a way that might permit some
greater coherence.
The niost important precedent is that of the Supreme Court
because it continues to be the place of first reference for inter-
pretations of the First Amendment as well as for much of the
learning in intellectual property. In particular, an examination
must be made of a handful of modern Supreme Court decisions
that have either recognized property interests in speech arising
outside statutory copyright or explored the margin between
copyright and free use. Those cases are International News
Amendment argument. See Joplin, slip op. at 6. For examples of cases in which courts
found publicity right violations on somewhat comparable facts, see, for example, Midler
v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding imitation of singing style
violates right of publicity); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp.
485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding use in a play of the characters created by the Marx
Brothers is a violation of their right to publicity), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317,
323 (2d Cir. 1982); and Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1361 (D.N.J. 1981)
(declaring imitation of Elvis Presley in a show violated his right of publicity).
380. This discussion will not include every decision relating to information. Most of
the Court's copyright opinions, for example, have dealt either with technical aspects of
the statute, see, e.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 162-64 (1985) (discussing
effect on licensee's rights of termination of copyright assignment to licensor), or with
uses that involved unambiguous copying of expression and were brought by plaintiffs
motivated by economic concerns, see, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 447-50 (1984) (involving videotaping of entire works). Two copyright fair use
cases that reached the Supreme Court were decided by an equally divided Court and did
not generate opinions. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), affig
by an equally divided Court 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 356
U.S. 43 (1958), affg by an equally divided Court 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). Some other
types of cases, such as those involving trademarks or claims within the traditional subject
matter of trade secrets law, are excluded because, although marginally relevant, they do
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Service v. Associated Press,8' Goldstein v. California,32 ZacChini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,m Harper & Row Publishers
v. Nation Enterprises,8 and Carpenter v. United States.385
The earliest, and in many ways the broadest, of these decisions
was that in International News Service. 86 The fact that the Court
decided this case at a time when its First Amendment jurispru-
dence was at best nascent may be one reason that it shows little
sensitivity to the implications of the dispute for speech lying
close to the core of First Amendment values. International News
Service seems rather to be a continuation of the prior century's
romance with expanding forms of intellectual property protection.
The importance of the misappropriation doctrine set out in
International News Service might possibly be discounted by ar-
guing that subsequent cases finding federal law to preempt state
unfair competition causes of action have essentially eroded it.17
This approach is too easy an escape, however, given the fact that
the Court continued to cite the case in such decisions as Carpenter
and Goldstein.8 International News Service was also invoked in
Zacchini, a case in which the Court clearly acknowledged the
possible conflict between property rights and the First Amend-
ment.389 Goldstein challenged a state unfair trade practice statute
on the ground that the federal Copyright Act preempted the
state's right to legislate in this area. 90 The dispute in Carpenter
involved a criminal prosecution for wire fraud based on the
not have a major and direct impact on First Amendment subject matter. Trade secrets
cases, for example, implicate principles of confidentiality and contract that are beyond
the scope of this Article. See supra note 29. Trademark law clearly can implicate First
Amendment values, see supra note 53, but discussion of those cases would expand this
Article beyond a manageable length.
381. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
382. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
383. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
384. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
385. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
386. See supra notes 354-68 for a discussion of International News Service.
387. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)
(preempting state law protection of unpatented boat hull design); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (preempting protection under state unfair competition
law of a lamp design); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)
(same).
388. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26; Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570. For a discussion of the
effect of the International News Service case on subsequent cases from the perspective
of intellectual property doctrine, see Baird, supra note 16, at 418-23; Samuelson, supra
note 280, at 388-95.
389. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
390. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551.
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unconsented use by a reporter of information gathered in the
course of his employment.391 In each case, the claimed property
right prevailed. As a result, International News Service continues
to loom over free speech rights like the 500-pound canary of the
old jokes. Where can it sit? Anywhere, one fears, that it wants.
The decisions in Carpenter, Goldstein, and Zacchini cover a
wide range of subject matters and forms of property interests.
The California statute approved in Goldstein protected the mak-
ers of sound recordings against duplication by "record pirates"
at a time when federal law did not yet extend any copyright
protection to such works.3 92 The Supreme Court upheld the state
law, seemingly concerned, as the Court was in International News
Service, that to do otherwise would permit the copyists to enjoy
unjustly the economic benefits of another's labor and invest-
ment. 93 The Court noted that the statute provided a narrow
form of property right in that it addressed only the practice of
selling other people's albums and tapes by recopying them onto
blank tapes or disks.394 The opinion focused on the issue of
whether federal law preempted the statute and thus cast little
light on the underlying issue of when a property right in unco-
pyrightable material was permissible. The majority opinion merely
noted that "there is no fixed, immutable line to tell us which
'human productions' are private property and which are so gen-
eral as to become 'free as the air.' ,95
In Zacchini, the Court took on that wavy line more directly,
this time in the face of an explicit First Amendment defense.
Ultimately, five members of the Court agreed that the press and
speech clauses did not insulate a television station from a claim
for damages by a performer whose entire act (which consisted
391. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 21-23.
392. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551-52. Phonorecordings are now protected to a limited
degree by federal copyright. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. S 114 (1988).
393. The Court explained:
Petitioners made no payments to the artists whose performances they
reproduced and sold, or to the various trust funds established for their
benefit; no payments were made to the producer, technicians, or other staff
personnel responsible for producing the original recording and paying the
large expenses incurred in production. No payments were made for the use
of the artists' names or the album title.
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 550 (footnote omitted).
394. Id. at 570-71.
395. Id. at 570.
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of being shot from a cannon, a process that, start to finish, took
fifteen seconds) was shown on a news program. 96
As it did in International News Service and in Goldstein, the
Court approved the creation of a property right in publicly
available information outside the confines of the Copyright Act.
This time the interest was the right of publicity. 97 The majority
found this common law doctrine, at least on the facts of Zacchini,
to be permissible as an analogue to the protections offered under
the copyright and patent clauses of the Constitution; it captured
for creators the economic value flowing from their own endeav-
ors. 98 Furthermore, the Court ruled that violation of the publicity
right was not excused under the First Amendment on newswor-
thiness grounds; the property interest operated as a gatekeeper
on the right to use the plaintiffs performance even when that
use occurred in the context of a communication that was accurate,
was of public interest, and did not involve product advertising
or promotion.3 99
Of these three common law cases decided after International
News Service, the most amazing for its loose and result-driven
reasoning is Carpenter.410 Underlying it was one of a series of
stock market scandals of the 1980's. Winans, a writer for the
Wall Street Journal, gave tips to friends about information that
he planned to include in future editions of his column, Heard on
the Street. The friends used those tips in stock trades that
occurred before publication of the columns and, as a result of
these trades, made nearly $700,000 in net profits.4 01 The Securities
and Exchange Commission characterized these transactions as
"insider trading," and an evenly divided Court affirmed the
defendants' conviction on that ground.40 2
The surprising part of the case is that-although the Wall
Street Journal never claimed such an interest-the government
also obtained convictions for mail fraud based on what it termed
the theft of confidential information4°3 (even though an outside
observer might be forgiven for having supposed it was the
"news"). A unanimous Court agreed,404 explaining that the fact
396. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
397. Id. at 575.
398. Id. at 573, 575-78.
399. Id. at 574-75.
400. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
401. Id. at 23.
402. Id. at 24.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 28.
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that the Wall Street Journal had suffered no economic loss from
the unconsented use of the information was immaterial; 05 it had
been deprived of its exclusive right of control, and that was the
essence of property.406 Neither, apparently, was it relevant-at
least it was never mentioned in the opinion-that the information
was scarcely private to the Wall Street Journal, having been
gathered in its entirety from outside sources.40 7 In addition, the
theft was of raw information, not of information embodied in a
particular form of expression. If taken at face value, here indeed
was a remarkable descendant of Prince Albert v. Strange.4 8
The fifth case to consider the distinction between property and
free speech, unlike the others, arose under statutory copyright.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,49 like
International News Service, Zacchini, and Carpenter, involved
information of public concern in the context of news reporting.
In this instance, a story in The Nation revealed the high points
of an as yet unpublished autobiography by former President
Gerald Ford, in particular focusing on the events surrounding
Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon.410 Under ordinary circumstances,
this kind of a report would lay easy claim to First Amendment
protection because it involved material at the "heart" of free
speech: the examination of public officials acting in their public
capacities.411 Harper & Row characterized it, however, as a copy-
right violation 412
The Nation article for the most part described the contents of
the Ford book in its own words, but it did quote about 300 to
400 words directly from various points in the 200,000 word
manuscript.4 13 The Court found those quotes sufficient to warrant
denials of both a First Amendment defense and the copyright
defense of fair use.414 Clearly the facts that the Ford book was
405. The defendants had not published the material, and, for that reason, they argued
that they had in no way diminished any economic benefit that the Journal anticipated
from its own use. I& at 26.
406. Id. at 26-27.
407. Somewhat mysteriously, however, the Court analogized the information to that
protected by the law of trade secrets. Id at 25.
408. 64 Eng. Rep. 293 W.C. 1849); see supra text accompanying notes 226-41.
409. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
410. Id, at 542-43.
411. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (stating that
ability to discuss public officials and public affairs is at core of First Amendment).
412. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543.
413. Id. at 548.
414. Id. at 569.
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not yet released and that The Nation scoop cost Ford and his
publishers a valuable sale of prepublication rights were central
considerations in the outcome.415
For purposes of this discussion, however, the important point
is that the value of the memoirs was hurt most by the lifting of
information from the book, not by the 300 or 400 words that The
Nation article quoted. The Court, however, pointedly avoided
dealing with that kind of borrowing, turning with apparent relief
to the quoted words. By characterizing the problem as the use
of "generous verbatim excerpts," 416 the Court was able to find a
use that the appellate court below had termed "infinitesimal" so
substantial an interference with property that neither fair use
nor the First Amendment could excuse it. 4 17
In these cases, the Court drew on the tradition described in
this Article of justifying the limitation on speech rights by
reference to the just deserts of labor and the demands of the
incentive theory.4 18 In some instances, however, the Court accom-
panied the use of the tradition with expressions of concern and
certain caveats. 419 Each case, furthermore, contained special facts
that could be used to limit or explain it. The question, therefore,
is whether some set of rational limitations on property could
possibly be derived from them without frankly scrapping existing
precedent and completely rethinking the premises of intellectual
property.
The best that can be said is, "maybe." In truth, caveats ex-
pressed in one case seem to be of no apparent concern in another,
and just what state and federal judges should take seriously in
415. As has been noted previously, unpublished manuscripts, prior to 1976, were
protected by common law copyright, and in general, no fair use defense was available
when such works were copied. David Benedict, Historians and the Continuing Controversy
over Fair Use of Unpublished Manuscript Materials, 91 Am. HiST. REv. 859, 861-67 (1986);
William R. Miner, Ex'ploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play?, 37 J. op CoPYMuHT
SOc'Y 1, 14 (1989). The 1976 Copyright Act brought unpublished works within the statute
for the first time, and, in addition, appeared clearly to subject them to the fair use
doctrine as well. See 17 U.S.C. S 107 (1988). The Supreme Court, however, was concerned
that too generous an application of the doctrine to an unpublished work would undercut
the author's interest in controlling the timing of initial publication. Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 554-55. The Court analogized the loss of that right to coerced speech. Because
the First Amendment also protects against coerced speech, a five-Justice majority was
able to conclude that The Nation could not defend itself under either a copyright or a
free speech analysis. Id. at 569.
416. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548-49.
417. Id. at 569.
418. See, e.g., id. at 555-57.
419. See, e.g., id. at 550.
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deciding a case involving Salinger's letters,420 a play about the
life of Janis Joplin, 421 or the publication of gossip about Procter
& Gamble 42 does not flow ineluctably from any source at present.
In struggling to find a common ground among these five cases,
I have so far been rewarded with only one. In no case did the
property right the Court granted mean that information would
be completely suppressed. In both International News Service and
Carpenter, the information was or would shortly be available to
at least some members of the public for public discussion and
debate.42 The statute in Goldstein prevented piracy of a work
that was already publicly obtainable.4 24 Both Zacchini and Harper
& Row made a point of, and counted in the plaintiffs' favor, the
fact that neither were seeking to suppress information but only
to profit from it.425 Copyright should not be used, the Court
cautioned in Harper & Row, to suppress facts. 4 6 This conclusion
is comforting, but it is hardly encouraging. A First Amendment
that is satisfied merely by the fact that someone, somehow, can
communicate the matter at issue would be a crabbed First
Amendment indeed.
The principle of access, as expressed in these cases, also does
not tell us when a court would be justified in tying that access
to payment, as the Court tied it in Zacchini.427 Does the right to
engage in speech that relies on another's labor depend on ob-
taining a license? And if so, can such a license be withheld at
will? If it can, the First Amendment of the future will be tied
420. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 375-79 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
423. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1987); International News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 238-39 (1918). Some members of the public-those
served by papers excluded from membership in the Associated Press, for example-
might, under the Court's reasoning in International News Serice, receive access to the
information considerably later than other members of the public. See id. at 245-46; supra
notes 368-73 and accompanying text.
424. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).
425. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542-44 (1985);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 433 U.S. 562, 569 (1977).
426. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545-47.
427. The Court noted in Zacchini that:
[I]n "right to publicity" cases the only question is who gets to do the
publishing. An entertainer such as petitioner usually has no objection to the
widespread publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit
of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner did not seek to
enjoin the broadcast . . .; he simply sought compensation . . . in the form
of damages.
Zaeehini, 433 U.S. at 573-74.
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in ways it has never been before to permission and to the
pocketbook as preconditions of a speaker's exercise of her own
expressive capacity. In short, access, without further definition,
is not very helpful.
Two other guiding principles can be derived from some of the
cases, although their significant drawback is that they appear to
be contradicted in others. One principle would afford property
rights only in that which could fairly be classified as expression.
The second would limit property protection to circumstances in
which commodification results in appropriate reallocations of mar-
ket value.429
The first principle, which would tie protection to the taking of
some discrete expression, can be derived from Goldstein, Zacchini,
and Harper & Row. In Goldstein, the statute prohibited the taking
of actual performances fixed into a specific form by virtue of
having been recorded43 Mr. Zacchini's "expression" - which con-
sisted of him personally being catapulted from a cannon-was
taken by videotaping and reshowing his performance. 431 In both
instances, the activity or the creation had a highly particularized
form that could be compared to that which counts under copyright
as expression. These were not cases involving imitators or users
of someone's style or persona; they were direct appropriations
of another's concrete work product. Both these cases, which arose
outside the reach of copyright, also are further distinguished by
the fact that what was taken was something that, standing alone,
had market value4 32 The opinion in Harper & Row also relied, as
has already been shown,483 on the actual quotation of words from
the Ford manuscript, although it is unclear whether these, stand-
ing alone, would have had much value.4
The argument that property rules protect only specific ex-
pression, however, is dealt a serious blow to the extent that
International News Service and Carpenter must be taken at face
value. In both, the thing taken was clearly not anything that
could be called "expression" without depriving that term of all
428. See infra notes 430-45 and accompanying text.
429. See infra notes 446-51 and accompanying text.
430. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).
431. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-64.
432. In Zacchini, for example, the Court stressed that the performer's entire act was
shown. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575. In Goldstein, whole recordings were taken and marketed
entirely for the appropriator's benefit. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 549-50.
433. See supra notes 409-17 and accompanying text (discussing Harper & Row case).
434. See supra text accompanying notes 409-17.
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its content.43 5 Furthermore, in Carpenter the Court gave no in-
dication that its ruling depended upon whether the information
was derived from some form of expression, either.438 What be-
longed to the Wall Street Journal at the time Mr. Winans took
it was probably inchoate information because it was far from
clear that Mr. Winans waited until he actually wrote his columns
to pass along his tips to his friends.
Having noted the contradictory precedent, however, I would
still like to suggest that the idea/expression distinction has great
merit as a line of demarcation on First Amendment and not
merely on intellectual property grounds.3 7 Copyright provides a
useful model, although, as Salinger and the derivative works
cases show, one that itself needs considerable refinement at the
margins.438
To obtain copyright protection, one must first produce a work,
and not merely isolated fragments or phrases.439 The work must
be reduced to a specific form to count as expression-an idea or
a concept cannot be copyrighted.O Neither can factual informa-
tion be copyrighted because it is, like ideas and concepts, a
building block of expression and not expression itself. 1 The fact
that someone invested time, energy, resources, or even imagi-
nation does not transform work into expression, even if what has
been produced can be turned into profitable expression for the
user's own benefit.
A reason supporting the transfer of this limitation from copy-
435. See supra notes 354-68 and accompanying text (discussing International News
Serice case); notes 400-08 and accompanying text (discussing Carpenter case).
436. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
437. As pointed out earlier, the idealexpression dichotomy can also be defended as a
limitation growing out of the public benefit theory of copyright. See supra notes 124-32
and accompanying text (discussing origins of idealexpression dichotomy in copyright); see
also Samuelson, supra note 280, at 365-66. For a general discussion of the history and
uses of this distinction, see Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law, 56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989).
438. One area in which courts thus far have been unable to distinguish between the
use of an idea and the making of a derivative work is in the design of computer programs.
Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236-37 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding structure, sequence, and organization of office computer program for dental
laboratories to be expression for purposes of copyright infringement), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987) uth Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003, 1013-14 (NJD. Tex. 1978) (holding sequence and ordering of computer program
to solve engineering problem is the idea, not expression).
439. See 17 U.S.C.A. S 102(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991) (stating that copyright protects
"works").
440. See id. S 102(b).
441. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
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right to other modes of protecting expressive values is that such
transfer would not require courts and legislatures to backtrack
entirely on their current, well-entrenched doctrines. At the same
time, the limits placed on the nonowner's expression would be
minimized. Again, this is demonstrated by looking to the example
of copyright. Although allowing a copyright that covers only a
fixed sequence or collection of symbols such as those that appear
in a book or a painting does somewhat diminish the choices that
a second user can make in expressing herself, such a rule contin-
ues to leave a wide scope for others to create similar works of
their own. Translated to a noncopyright context, one could pro-
tect Mr. Zacchini's full performance with a property right but
could not inhibit discussion of it, or prevent another performer
from attempting a similar feat. So, too, could the law permit a
comedian to prevent the appropriation by others of his actual
monologue, but not another comic entertainer from mimicking
his performance style and appearance. 442
Strict time limits should be imposed on these extra-copyright
interests. Although the term of the copyright has grown suffi-
ciently long to be in itself a subject of concern to those interested
in free speech, perpetual copyrights, at least, are prohibited by
the Constitution. 43 Perpetual rights ought to be viewed with a
jaundiced eye elsewhere as well. At some point, allocation of
profit and an author's just deserts have to be less important
than the enrichment of the public domain. Furthermore, intellec-
tual property rights should ordinarily be limited, as is copyright,
by a fair use doctrine,444 so that a news program that shows five
seconds of Zacchini's brief performance, or a critic who wanted
to give an example of an improvisationalist's monologue, would
not be deemed to have violated a property right.
However appealing in the abstract it might be to award indi-
viduals broader property rights in such vague interests as the
emanations of their unique personality, the privacy cases teach
us that an open-ended, free-form approach can quickly become a
muzzle on the ability of others to express their unique person-
alities and perspectives. A personality, even a carefully cultivated
one, or a set of mannerisms with or without accompanying iden-
tifying physical characteristics, should not be propertized because
442. I do not intend to imply, however, that imitations designed to mislead the public
about the nature or source of the performance could not be remedied. This is a separate
question entirely, implicating the law of trademarks.
443. The Copyright and Patent Clause specifies that protection be only for a limited
time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 8.
444. See supra note 126 (discussing fair use doctrine).
734 [Vol. 33:665
1992] INFORMATION AS SPEECH, INFORMATION AS GOODS 735
these are the raw materials of communication, not the sort of
captured "take" on the world that qualifies as expression.
In truth, this system may not prove very costly to those
individuals who enjoy fame, beauty, or other desirable personal
assets and want to market them because those who want to use
those attributes will often need the cooperation of the person
and will have to pay for it. Therefore, the possessors are likely
to be able to exploit these advantages without a formal property
scheme to assist in the process. Contracts, both formal and
implied, can and do mediate nany such exchanges now. 445
The remaining principle that can be derived from four of the
five cases the Supreme Court has considered is that property
rules should apply to communicative material only insofar as they
are necessary to remedy actual economic loss or the realistic
threat of it. Goldstein, Zacehini, Harper & Row, and even that
unwieldy monster, International News Service, were all about
plaintiffs who saw a serious threat to their bottom lines. Record
piracy and the reproduction of an entire performance are capable
of substituting for the original product and thus are classic
examples of the sort of case in which a reasonable finding could
be made that one who makes profitable use of the original has
deprived the plaintiff of something she might otherwise have
enjoyed. Even though only a. small amount of expression was
taken in Harper & Row, the plaintiffs certainly could attribute
to it a very concrete loss. 446 On these grounds, one might argue
that economic harm is a precondition of finding a private right
to be infringed, whether it goes by the name of publicity, copy-
right, or anything else.
The imperfect world of precedent, however, does not permit
any great confidence that the Court intended such a limitation.
In Carpenter, the petitioners indeed tried to argue that Interna-
tional News Service required a showing of monetary loss as a
precondition for finding that an appropriation of information
occurred.447 Deprivation of the exclusive right to use the infor-
mation, said the unanimous Court, is the gravamen of the offense,
and not an infliction of a marketplace loss."8
445. A somewhat similar argument has been made, in far greater detail than is
attempted here, that the use of private arrangements is actually a more efficient means
to foster creativity and authorship than the system of statutory copyrights and patents.
Palmer, supra note 278, at 329-42.
446. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. at 559, 567 (1985)
(declaring "Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and its refusal to pay the
$12,500 were the direct effect of the infringement").
447. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1987) (rejecting Petitioner's argu-
ment that a showing of monetary loss is required).
448. Id.
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I would respectfully suggest that Carpenter be relegated to its
special facts and that the courts get on with the task of fortifying
the border between speech and property rights. Although, for
reasons pointed to earlier in this Article," 9 proof of economic
loss cannot be a sufficient ground for finding a property right,
it may nevertheless be an important part of the mix of necessary
rules. I would further suggest that the burden of making a clear
showing on that point probably ought to increase as the amount
of expression taken decreases. By this, I mean that a copyright
holder complaining of the unconsented use of a comparativelly
small fragment of her work should be required to show clearly
and convincingly that she has either suffered actual economic
loss or that she is likely to be deprived in the future of economic
benefits that are neither unduly speculative nor vague. When an
or substantially all of a work is taken, a less rigorous proof of
economic loss would- ordinarily defeat a fair use claim."'m These
rules should apply in copyright as well as at common law.
A serious application of this approach would curtail, even if it
may not entirely eliminate, the use of property law to achieve
objectives that the First Amendment, on its own territory, seeks
to forbid. For example, it might limit the ability of claimants to
control how, when, and whether information is communicated
when their primary objectives relate to distaste for the speaker
or her speech. J.D. Salinger, for instance, could not so easily use
copyright to try to avoid the constraints imposed by the Free
Speech Clause on his ability to control publicity if he actually
had to establish a serious likelihood that the indirect and partial
use of his letters by his biographer would displace or even
significantly reduce the demand on the market for the originals
themselves. 451 Common law plaintiffs who can now hide any
number of motives under the property rubric would be less likely
to sue if they were held to firmer proof of loss of expected profit.
Currently, anyone who meets the abstract requirement of having
"created" a valuable personality or other attribute can use that
449. See supra notes 368-73 and accompanying text.
450. In these cases one might expect the court to presume the existence of economic
harm. The Supreme Court, however, has refused to apply such a presumption when the
copying was for noncommercial purposes, see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); in such cases, actual proof of economic harm appears to be
necessary.
451. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text (discussing Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987)).
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value as a surrogate for economic injury, even if none is antici-
pated or could be proven.45 2
In addition, a focus on loss of expected profits might also have
a salutary impact on remedies.4-s Injunctive relief is a fine way
to protect an ordinary owner's rights against a competing sub-
stituting use, but when the infringing use contributes a large
measure of its own new expression, the remedy should be used
cautiously, if at all. Having a doctrine in free speech law that
severely limits the use of prior restraints, 45 only to throw it all
out whenever even a small amount of someone else's expression
has been incorporated into the defendant's speech makes no
sense. Currently, injunctions are a routinely available form of
relief in copyright cases.45 Injunctive relief has also been avail-
able in common law cases of misappropriation,456 appropriation, 457
452. An example of the way common law intellectual property rights can be invoked
to protect noneconomic values can be seen in Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). The defendant,
after King's death, manufactured and sold plastic busts of the civil rights leader. Id. at
698. Dr. King had not made a profit from marketing his physical appearance while alive.
I& at 706. Neither King's estate or the nonprofit corporation that sued American Heritage
were interested in marketing busts of their own. Id. at 699. But the court, based on an
alleged economic interest, said the estate should nonetheless have the right to "control,
preserve and extend his status and memory," an interest the law would be unlikely to
protect if considered as a matter of First Amendment rights. Id. at 706.
453. Paul Goldstein made a somewhat similar argument twenty years ago, urging that
remedies in copyright be based only on economic loss and that reliance on injunctive
relief generally be abandoned. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 1029-35. Unfortunately, the
practices of the courts have not been affected in the subsequent years by his thoughtful
arguments. The Honorable James C. Oakes, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, recently also urged caution in the issuance of injunctions for
copyright violations. See James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Cop yremedies: Unfair Use and
Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 983, 992-97 (1990).
454. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (prohibiting use
of gag order affecting the press during the period prior to a criminal trial); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (refusing injunctive relief for a claim
that asserted the interest of national security).
455. This practice has come under some reexamination by judges themselves. See, e.g.,
New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt Co., 884 F.2d 659, 661 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Miner, J., concurring) (agreeing with denial of rehearing and stating that "equitable
considerations always are germane to the determination of whether an injunction is
appropriate"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990); i. at 663-64 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(discussing the discretionary nature of injunctions); see also Newman, supra note 50, at
16-17 (discussing New Era and stating that the issue of whether public interest will
justify the denial of injunctions is unresolved).
456. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245-46 (1918)
(affirming the issuance of an injunction to prevent misappropriation of news).
457. See, e.g., Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct.
1984) (granting injunctive relief for appropriation of physical appearance of plaintiff), affid
without opinion, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985).
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and violation of the right of publicity.4- If the primary justifi-
cation for protecting intellectual property interests is, as I think
it must be, economic, then compensatory damages should also be
the primary form of remediation.
Whatever their flaws on theoretical or pragmatic grounds,
these three principles, applied in tandem, would certainly provide
at least some brake on the ad hoc declaration of property rights.
Taken together, of course, they would also implicitly do away
with at least some of the cited precedent. Even, for example, if
Associated Press could show that it suffered a concrete economic
loss at the hands of its rival, International News Service, it would
now lose because the rival did not take expression and therefore
utilized nothing to which it was not entitled under the First
Amendment.4 9 The government would have to proceed in a case
like Carpenter on insider trading grounds alone; the property leg
of the opinion would be knocked out under the proposed rules.
460
Application of these principles to the facts in Salinger would
also result in a different outcome. For example, if the distinction
between expression and idea were given a grounding in both the
relevant constitutional provisions, then the paraphrasing in ques-
tion might on balance have been classified as a constitutionally
protected use of information and ideas rather than an infringe-
ment of a private property right. In addition, if the small amount
of use were put together with the weak evidence of economic
harm, so too might the property right have been denied on
grounds of absence of injury.
One additional suggestion does not derive from these speech-
as-property cases, although neither is it contradicted by them;
and it is a proposition that has clear and strong support in First
Amendment doctrine. In deciding whether to apply property
rules, courts should proceed with the same degree of content
neutrality that governs the evaluation of speech regulations in
458. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing denial of injunction for violation of
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s right of publicity).
459. See supra notes 354-68 and accompanying text (discussing International News
Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)).
460. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (discussing the misappro-
priation of property). Again, it should be emphasized that, despite the Court's efforts to
muddy the waters in this regard, the information itself is not the equivalent of a trade
secret and cannot be protected on that basis. See id. It may be possible to say that,
under some circumstances, the fact that information will or will not be included in a
publication could have value, but the Wall Street Journal has alternative means to protect
that value; it does not need the broad property right the Court awarded it. Id. at 28.
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other sorts of controversies. 461 Courts in close cases should not
resolve the free speech or property controversy based on their
approval or disapproval of the nature or the purpose of the use.462
Privacy should not be protected by property rules in ways that
contradict the rules that apply under the First Amendment;
vulgarity or criticism should not be punished under the guise of
a property rule if the substance of the offending communication
is of a sort that the speech clause would protect. Property
principles may occasionally give incidental protection to other
interests, but that should be a byproduct of the neutral applica-
tion of the principles of protecting access, expression, and profit,
not an accepted independent purpose for applying property rules.
If a party's conduct is relevant on some independent ground (for
example, breach of a fiduciary duty), then the case should go off
on that ground and not be submerged into the concept of "prop-
erty."
IV. CONCLUSION
As this Article shows, the result of the early, isolated paths
of development followed by property and by free speech theory
has been the evolution of two internally inconsistent approaches
to the use of information and ideas and doctrinal confusion
between the role of speech as a constitutionally protected common
and speech as a privately owned commodity. What must be
acknowledged before this tangle can be unraveled is that the
First Amendment, however important in our twentieth century
jurisprudence of rights, has no talismanic power to prevent
incursions by property law. To limit such incursions, the sphere
of property must be agreed upon, and its currently fluid outlines
461. For a discussion of content neutrality in the First Amendment context, see Hudnut
v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd mom., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
462. If this principle were applied, for example, a court could not consider the fact
that the defendant's alleged use was in a vulgar or otherwise distasteful work. For
example, see MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1981), a case in which the
defendant's "dirty" lyrics appear to have been a factor in a finding of copyright infringe-
ment. This attention to the suitability of the user's work is sometimes described as a
way of protecting the "reputation" of the copyright holder's work, and indirectly its
market value, and is sometimes pursued under state law on an anti-dilution theory. See,
e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 137 (NJ). Ga. 1981)
(holding that plaintiff had failed to show a loss of customers or confusion caused by ad
parody). The protection of reputation should not, however, be treated differently under
intellectual property law than it is under the First Amendment.
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given fairly concrete form. Otherwise, the trend in modern case
law suggests that speech values, like the western territories in
the early nineteenth century, are at risk of being hit by a land
rush.
The modest suggestions made here-requiring property rules
to be content-neutral and allowing them to limit access to infor-
mation only to the extent that some formal embodiment of
expression is involved and some serious claim of concrete eco-
nomic harm can be made-will not solve the problem of the "land
rush" entirely, although they certainly should help. What is
needed most of all is the adoption of a clearer perspective from
which to approach conflicts between property and free speech
claims. It seems unlikely, based on history, that property claims,
focusing as they do on allocation of value, are capable of taking
adequate account of the very different kind of "value" that lies
at the heart of the First Amendment. Perhaps, therefore, we
need to start consistently from the other end, and approach all
of these information cases with the question, what room is left
for private property rights after we have attended to the claims
of free speech?
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